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The purpose of this work is to discuss the rise and decline of 
District Twenty-one of the United Mine Workers of America. The dis-
trict became a major force in Oklahoma after successfully gaining 
recognition by the mine owners of Oklahoma, Arkansas, and Texas in 
1903. Its greatest moment came in the Oklahoma constitutional conven-
tion of 1907 where Pete Hanraty of the miners served as vice-president. 
For two decades, the union was a major factor in the Oklahoma Federa-
tion of Labor and helped to gain significant benefits for the working 
men and women of the state. In the 1920s, the miners' organization 
began the long period of decline in which the lessening demand for 
coal and internal and external problems resulted in the loss of the 
district's autonomy in 1929. After that year, the district became de-
pendent for its survival on the strength of the national organization. 
The history of District Twenty-one is important because the union was 
so influential in the early development of the state and because it 
reflects national trends in the United Mine Workers of America. This 
work will illustrate how the miners, economically strong and supported 
by Oklahomans, created a state which reflected their interests, and 
how economic, political, and social changes promoted that union's col-
lapse. 
The officers of District Twenty-one have not aided in this work. 
Possibly their cooperation might have made this task easier. 
iii 
N<•v<•rtlu•less, alternative sources of information have made this his-
tory feasible. Any errors are mine. 
A number of people have assisted in this project. The staffs of 
the Oklahoma Historical Society's newspaper room, library, and archives 
have been consistently helpful as have those of the Western History 
Collection and the libraries of Oklahoma University and Oklahoma State 
University. Their kindnesses are gratefully if inadequately ac-
knowledged. 
Thanks are due as well to Dr. Joseph Stout who gave me my first 
understanding of the art of writing and to Dr. John Paul Bischoff who 
has unwaveringly encouraged my interest in coal mines and miners. A 
special indebtedness is due Dr. James Smallwood for his constant as-
sistance and for his unceasing insistence that the work be done and 
that it be done properly. Correction, suggestion, guidance--for these 
I am grateful. 
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BIRTH OF A UNION 
Men have buried themselves in the pursuit of coal for at least 
four hundred years. Traditionally, the work was hard and dangerous. 
In the nineteenth century, miners made periodic attempts to ameliorate 
their lot, but all efforts failed before the superior strength of the 
operators. It was not until the miners organized and provided a 
counterforce to management that conditions became tolerable, if not 
humane. Unionization of the miners in the Southwest Coal Field was 
attempted during a strike from 1899 to 1903 which made District Twenty-
one of the United Mine Workers of America the dominant force in the 
southwestern field for two decades. 
Miners worked in Indian Territory as early as the 1870s. The 
Knights of Labor made the first efforts to unionize the territory's 
coal miners. The Knights organized the territory quickly but failed 
because their national leaders hesitated to use the strike as a bar-
gaining tool. By 1885, the Knights faced the competition of an af-
filiate of the American Federation of Labor, the National Federation 
of Miners. The rivalry weakened the miners' cause; consequently, the 
two unions merged into the United Mine Workers of America (U.M.W.A.) 
in 1890. 1 
The new union was willing to use the strike to secure its goals 
which included elimination of scrip, 2 prohibition of labor by persons 
1 
less than fourteen years of age, better safet~ laws, the eight hour 
day, and other demands which owners resisted. On July 4, 1897, union 
miners struck in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, West Virginia, and 
Illinois. Within a year, the miners of the Central Competitive Field--
all the strike area except eastern Pennsylvania and West Virginia--won 
the eight hour day and wage increases of from 20 to 40 percent. This 
settlement provided the standard to be met in negotiations in other 
American coal fields. 3 
2 
Conditions in the mines of Indian Territory and Arkansas made it 
probable that union men there would seek a comparable improvement. 
Indian Territory was a most dangerous area for miners, with a fatal ac-
cident rate during the period from 1894 to 1900 consistently higher 
than any other area and "two to three times more ••• than foreign 
countries. 114 After 1894, territorial mines went deeper, and mining 
methods became more complicated. Explosive gas and unstable roof 
structures in the region's mines increased the danger. 5 To the miners, 
risks required rewards. 
In January of 1899, the miners and operators of District Twenty-
one--Indian Territory, Arkansas, and part of Missouri--met at Pittsburg, 
Kansas, to negotiate the contract for the following year. The miners 
demanded increased wages and an eight-hour day. Owners countered that 
they had not recovered from the continuing depression of 1893 and that 
sales were hampered by a shortage of transport. Before a settlement 
6 
occurred, a strike disrupted the proceedings. 
At Hartshorne, near McAlester, 300 men struck mines three and six 
to protest the firing of miners, allegedly for membership in the 
U.M.W.A. Within a few days, sixty men lost their jobs. Declaring his 
willingness to rehire tlie men only if they were non-union, the mine 
' supcrintC'ndent gave the l;1bon•rs a l lst of grievance's. He stated that 
lw would al low no pit commlttl'e, no w;1ge Increase, and no recognition 
of the U.M.W.A. He wanted to run his mine his way, and "if he could 
7 
not do so he would shut the mines down." 
A U.M.W.A. organizer added to the tension when he listed the pur-
poses of the U.M.W.A. as providing "cloder relations" between the 
workers and the owners, preventing strikes, and establishing a wage 
scale--procedures designed to allow the owners to plan more wisely for 
the future. Opponents of the union perceived this as equal to removal 
of management from the owners into the hands of the miners. The or-
ganizer al~o noted the miners' grievances such as the lack of a check-
weighman to verify the weight of coal actually mined and a prevailing 
wage well below union scale. Given ample reasons, the miners struck. 8 
Initially the stoppage was small and peaceful. Men at Alderson 
3 
joined the strike on February 11 and those at Wilburton five days later. 
On February 26, the Oklahoma State Capital reported that a general 
strike of all miners in Indian Territory and Arkansas was set for March 
1. The strikers asked a "small" wage increase of six cents a ton and 
recognition of the U.M.W.A. They proclaimed the stoppage to be the 
"effort or their lives for ••• if they fail[ed] this effort then 
9 [wouJdl be Jost all hope" of ever organizing the mines. Owners were 
equally firm, and, according io Frederick Lynne Ryan, the next four 
years were a time of "riots, bombing and burning of mine property, 
eviction and arrest of union members, the importation of strikebreakers, 
the use of armed guards and battles between them and the . " miners • • • 
as well as the discharge and blacklisting of unionists and injunctions 
f d . h . 10 or an against t e unions. 
As early as March 5, 1899, seven black laborers went from Indian 
I 
Territory to Arkansas to work in the mines, but these men decided, 
after talking with union members, to return home. In May, William F. 
4 
Kelly, an agent of the Missouri and Kansas Coal Company, decided to use 
Negro laborers to break the strike. He offered blacks in Leavenworth, 
Kansas, sixty cents a ton or $2.75 each day to work in the mines of 
his company. In July, four train coaches of blacks from West Virginia 
received an escort from a United States marshal and sixteen deputies 
on the train ride to Coalgate, Indian Territory. The South McAlester 
Capital reported in August that "all the mines are being rapidly filled 
up and [in a few weeks] will be running just as if no strike had taken 
11 place." 
Sometimes the courts hampered the unionists. In sentencing ten 
unionists for conspiracy for the purposes of intimidating and terror-
izing strikebreakers in violation of a court injunction, Judge J. H. 
Rogers of J\rkansas characterized the actions of the men as "anarchy" 
as he levied prison terms varying from four to ten months. In another 
case, this same judge remarked, "It will be a very bad day for the 
country when it reaches that point that any man or set of men can with 
impunity defy regularly constituted authority. 1112 For destroying mine 
property, the men earned terms of four months in jail, "to remain there 
until the costs [were] paid. 1113 
Hut the courts aided the miners also. Although the Atoka Coal 
and Mining Company won an injunction restraining the miners of Coalgate 
from interfering with those who chose to work, the union won a case 
5 
against the Kali-Inla Coal Company when the company elected not to pro-
vide evidence •. In Kansas, Judge A.H. Skedmore prevented the Kansas 
and Texas Coal Company from importing blacks~ The jurist enjoined the 
company from bringing into its mines ''convict labor, undesirable citi~ 
zens or people with malignant or contagious diseases. 1114 Presumbly, 
"scabs" qualified on one or more counts. 
There was violence as well. At Huntington, Arkansas, in May of 
1899, striking miners used dynamite and gunfire against strikebreakers 
and company guards. One striker died, and an unknown assailant shot a 
mine guard in the head. But mining was a dangerous occupation anyway. 
On January 4, 1900, a charge exploded prematurely at Jenny Lind mine 
number seventeen. 0 . d. d d h . d . . • 15 ne miner ie an anot er receive injuries. The 
cheapness of life in the coal mines was such that bombing and shooting 
were less an aberration than if they had taken place in a more peaceful 
environment. And peace was returning. 
Less than a year after vowing "the struggle of their lives," the 
miners of District Twenty-one felt beaten. In November of 1899, 300 
miners at Hartshorne, the original seat of the strike, voted to sever 
all ties with the union and to return to their jobs. Even the vice-
president of the Bonanza local returned to the mines. Also, the owners 
remained firm in their refusal to recognize th~ union. By early 1900, 
the union--with only 300 members--was dying. 16 
At this critical juncture in the fight for recognition, a new man 
became president of District Twenty-one, U.M.W.A.--Pete Hanraty. On 
assuming the presidency of a failing district, he acted quickly to re-
vitalize the miners and eventually brought their cause to a successful 
conclusion. llanraty wasted no time in seeking to divide the owners. 
lie organized strikebreakers, entered into contracts with small op~ra-
tors, and, i.n his words, ''established guarrila [sic] warfare agains~ 
the larg [sic] operators that refused to sign ••• [with the 
union.] 1117 
6 
From August 1, 1901, to May 31, 1902, strike relief cost District/ 
Twenty-one $1,276.80, of which $500.00 came from the international 
headquarters. In a letter 1of June 1, 1902, John Mitchell, President 
of the United Mine Workers of America, stated, "A continuation of the 
present policy of conducting the strike cannot, under any circumstances, 
1 . . 1118 resu t in its success. But Hanraty declined to surrender. He sug-
gested that the men return to work and continue to organize their non-
union co-workers. He also refused to call off the strike because, as 
he noted, that action "would fill this District full of men and prevent 
any concessions that we may be able to secure through the scarcity of 
19 
men." In his report to the annual convention of District Twenty-one 
in 1902, Hanraty noted that th~ union had organized 1,764 miners in 
A k d I d T . 20 r ansas an n ian erritory. 
Throughout the strike, Hanraty worked to secure a meeting with the 
operators. On June 5, 1902, the smaller operators listed seven demands 
to be met by the union before a meeting could occur. Hanraty agreed. 
Meeting at Fort Smith, Arkansas, the two sides agreed to a contract 
which gave the miners wage increases and eliminated the lowered winter 
rate in Arkansas. More important, the smaller operators conceded recog-
nition. Four companies held out--the Central Coke and Coal Company, 
the Missouri Pacific Railroad, the Rock Island Line, and the Kansas 
and Texas Railroad--the "Big Four." But they yielded in 1903. 21 
7 
From July lJ to July 25, 1903, the union forces, headed by John 
Mitchell, and the op(•rators, including the Big Four, met at Pittsburg, 
Kansas. The first meetings de11lt with comparatively minor matters, but 
on July 25 the strike was won. The Big Four agreed with the other 
operators and the union that as of September 1, 1903, the 50,000 miners 
of Kansas, Missouri, Indian Territory, Arkansas, and Texas would re-
ceive 72 cents a ton, a 7 cent increase, and a 25 percent increase in 
day wages as well as the eight hour day. Most important, the opera-
tors, large and small, recognized the U.M.W.A. 22 For the next twenty-
two years the U.M.W.A. was the dominant force in the coal mines of the 
Southwest. 
The strike in the Southwest was not typical of the struggles of 
the time. Other coal strikes were shorter, more violent, and generally 
more intense, reaching a conclusion within a matter of months in most 
cases. The situation in Indian Territory dragged on for four years. 
The strike was lost in 1900, but one man refused to quit. Pete Hanraty 
was the decisive factor in the successful outcome of the U.M.W.A. or-
ganizing effort. When the Big Four recognized the miners' union in 
1903, they ensured the future of that union for two decades. But dur-
ing the twenty years of U.M.W.A. strength, circumstances beyond the 
control of the union eroded its success. 
During the period of its power, District Twenty-one played a major 
role in th~ formation of Oklahoma. The major activity of Pete Hanraty 
in the meetings leading to the constitutional convention and in the 
convention itself was one of the highlights of the district's history. 
After statehood, peace in the coalfields enabled the industry to 
flourish and to remain a major asset for the new state. But the dis-
trict had problems. 
Before World War I, the union endured a major lawsuit--the Coro-
nado Coal case. It also endured an internal disorganization--first 
8 
the investigation of the socialist, Fred Holt, then the expulsion of 
Pete Hanraty. The union stabilized during the war, but the strike of 
1919 eroded popular support, and the "Red Scare" enhanced anti-union 
feeling in the United States. Oklahomans shared that mood, and when 
the open shop movement arose, the union had too little standing to ward 
off the threat. The decreasing role of coal in the American economy 
further weakened the union. By 1930, the national organization con-
trolled the district by means of a trusteeship. 
By transferring the responsibility for major decisions to the na-
tional office, the trusteeship gave the district the strength of the 
international rather than the weakness of the disorganized and frag-
mented autonomous organization. The trusteeship kept the district 
afloat in stormy seas. By 1933, the national organization was in dan-
ger. But Franklin D. Roosevelt determined to restore the American 
economy, and one sector in need of repair was organized labor. The New 
Deal saved the U.M.W.A., and the U.M.W.A. saved District Twenty-one. 
Prosperity returned to the coal mines of Arkansas and Oklahoma 
during World War II, but the wartime demand disappeared when the need 
for marginal mines' production ended. After the war, the decline con-
tinued. The bright spot in Oklahoma was the ability of the U.M.W.A. 
to improve conditions for coal miners throughout the United States. By 
1967, few coal miners remained in Oklahoma. Recovery required a new 
9 
demand for marginally valuable coal resources. That became possible 
when middle eastern nations halted shipments of petroleum to the United 
States in 1973. The coal mines of Oklahoma and Arkansas had the op-
portunity to be productive once again. 
The history of District Twenty-one, as that of coal in Oklahoma, 
was one of continuous deterioration with only occasional periods of 
promise. However, the district made contributions to American life. 
It helped to form one state. More important, District Twenty-one sur-
vived. The U.M".W.A. once had fifty districts. Twenty disappeared. 
This, then, is the story not of victory but of survival. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE GOOD YEARS 
After the coal strike of 1903, miners in Oklahoma returned to 
tunneling and blasting the state's 12,000 miles of ~oal land. They 
continued a life whose principal characteristic was its isolation, a 
life in a company town where, according to Frederick Lynne Ryan, "the 
desirability of locating the houses near to the miners has frequently 
been secured at the sacrifice of the conditions of health and corn-
1 fort." The miners returned to a job where even during the best years, 
1916 to 1921, the average number of days worked reached only 193, and 
in the years from 1925 to 1932, the average was 150. Oklahoma coal 
miners worked with little security. From 3,000 in the territorial 
period, the number of miners grew to between 8,000 and 9,000 during 
World War I but then declined with postwar demand to approximately 
3 500 . h d . 2 , prior to t e epression. When they did work, miners faced the 
risk of not ~urviving to be laid off. 
In the ten years prior to 1922, the fatality rate for each 1,000 
miners averaged 4.30 nationally; Oklahoma had an average of 6.83 
whereas Arkansas averaged 3.00. The highest state average was 12.24 
and the lowest 1.16, both in comparatively minor coal producing re-
gions, New Mexico and Texas. Between 1892 and 1931, nineteen explo-
sions killed 510 men in Oklahoma; the four disasters in 1929 and 1930 
killed 116. But the nation demanded coal, even the comparatively small 
12 
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amount that District Twenty-one provided. Therefore, the men of the 
coalfields continued to dig but never ceased to fight for a reasonable 
life for themselves and for others whose conditions of life mocked the 
American dream. At Shawnee, at the Oklahoma constitutional convention, 
in the councils of the Twin Territories Federation of Labor, in the 
legislature--miners fought wherever possible to gain reforms. The hey-
day of minets' influence could not last forever, but the union domi-
nated the coalfields until the 1920s. While its influence lasted, 
District Twenty-one was involved in some of the most important events 
of Oklahoma history. 
The miners of District Twenty-one, especially President Pete Han-
raty, had a mission. As Hanraty said: 
Our cause demands that there is no working man so deep 
down in the abyss of misery and despair that we dare 
refuse to extend a helping hand in his uplifting, and 
there is no pinacle [sic] of grandeur so high that the 
toiling masses should not aspire to attain it.4 
One way to help the "toiling masses" was to organize the unorganized. 
After the miners showed their ability to deal with the owners, 
the first step was to combine with the other working people of the ter-
ritory. On December 28, 1903, delegates from fifteen miners' locals, 
two bartenders' locals, two printers' locals, one plasterers' local, 
and one or two other locals met at Lawton for the purpose of forming 
the Twin Territories Federation of Labor. The organization, presided 
over by President Hanraty of District Twenty-one, received a charter 
from the American Federation of Labor on February 10, 1904. 
Within two years, the Twin Territories Federation met at the most 
significant convention in the history of Oklahoma labor. Previously, 
President Theodore Roosevelt had signed the statehood enabling act on 
14 
June 16, 1906. Consequently, the progressive forces in the territory 
sought to create a state in which the people would be sheltered from 
the trusts, the railroads, and the Republican administrations ofter-
ritorial days. At the third annual convention of the Twin Territories 
Federation of Labor, miners drafted a list of twenty-four demands for 
submission to the expected constitutional convention. On August 20, 
1906, representatives of labor and of the Farmers' Union met at Shawnee, 
Indian Territory, to draft their program. In September, they were 
joined by representatives of the Railroad Brotherhoods and on September 
10, as the Shawnee Joint Labor Board, issued a list of sixteen legis-
lative demands and eight prohibitive demands. 6 
Legislative demands were those that labor wanted included in the 
constitution. Among others, they included the initiative, referendum, 
and recall; employer liability in cases of accident due to negligence 
of a fellow servant; compulsory education and free textbooks; and health 
and safety legislation. Matters which the constitution was to prohibit 
included employment of children less than sixteen years of age in mines, 
mills, and factories; contracting of convict labor; and speculation in 
7 farm products, among others. 
The Democratic Party was sympathetic to the demands of the Joint 
Labor Board, drafting a platform agreeing to all but equal suffrage. 
Commenting on the sweeping demands of labor and the platform of the 
Democrats, Kate Barnard remarked, "Everything was advocated but the 
rights of men." 8 The program was sweeping. 
When the convention met, the farmers preferred "Alfalfa Bill" 
Murray for president while labor backed Pete Hanraty. To avoid giving 
conservatives control of the convention, the progressives compromised, 
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selecting Murray as the presidential and Hanraty as the vice-
presidential candidate. Both 9 The program drafted at the Twin won. 
Territories Federation of Labor Convention and at Shawnee had one of 
labor's strongest leaders in a position to enact it. 
Although Hanraty was the sole labor representative at the consti-
tutional convention, his positions as vice-president and as a member of 
the committees on municipal corporations, mines and mining, oil and 
gas, public debt and public works, and counties and county boundaries 
allowed him to exert a great amount of influence on the document to be 
drafted. He spoke little in the convention. He kept his vote pledges 
in line by means of private conversations wherein he implied the pos-
sible loss of labor support in the future campaigns of those who failed 
to cooperate with labor's desires. According to Milton E. Asfahl, Han-
raty was "instrumental in having many provisions for the protection of 
labor introduced into the Constitution of Oklahoma. 1110 But Hanraty had 
opponents. 
One individual, S. W. Murphy, wrote the president of the constitu-
tional convention, asking how the farmer could find labor if the eight-
hour day were law? How could he afford higher priced coal? Was Pete 
Hanraty an American citizen? Murphy further charged the following: 
You up hold a gang that will not allow an American 
Citizen to work or maintain a livelihood unless they 
pay twenty-five dollars into the union • • • The 
U.M. of A. Deprives citizens of the right of life, 
liberty and persuit [sic] of happiness without due 
process of law.11 
Hanraty countered with his major speech of the convention. He had no 
apologies for being a reformer, for, as he said, when "people don't ad-
vacate reforms they will die ••• To call me an anarchist or a 
socialist--! don't know whether it is a discredit or an honor. 1112 
16 
Labor received support in t~e document sent to the people of the 
new state. At the convention of 1907 of the Oklahoma Federation of La-
bor, the proud labor leader, Pete Hanraty, itemized each demand and the 
place in the constitution where it had been met. The initiative, refer-
endum, and recall appeared in article five; the primary and the plural-
ity vote occurred in article three; denial of martial law dominated 
. 1 h d d . d . . 13 art1c e two--eac eman gaine recognition. The labor movement of 
Oklahoma and President Pete Hanraty were justly proud of their efforts. 
But there was yet work to be done. 
The constitution authorized many things needed by labor; the first 
legislature of the new state had the task of transferring theory into 
practice. Labor had sought mine safety legislation in 1902. That task 
proved difficult because the United States Congress wrote t~rritorial 
laws. Despite the fact that the year 1901 was one of the most fatal for 
Indian Territory miners, Senator Boise Penrose of Pennsylvania had the 
short-firing controls deleted from the desired safety legislation. 
14 Then the bill died in committee. The federal Congress was not con-
cerned sufficiently for the men of District Twenty-one. In 1907, legis-
lation was enacted closer to home. 
Completed by the first legislature of Oklahoma were many acts de-
sired by the miners: the establishment of a state mining board, the 
requirement of weighing before screening which allowed a more accurate 
determination of the wages due a man, a factory inspector, a board of 
conciliation and arbitration, a mandatory statement of strike conditions 
when advertising for workers if relevant, the eight hour day for all 
state, county, and city employees, and other useful laws. But some of 
the statutes were less than what the miners desired. The owners 
17 
managed to eliminate from the mining board bill the article which re-
quired an examination board composed of miners to determine who was 
qualifi.ed to mine. The farmers weakened the arbitration board in gain-
ing two seats on the six man board rather than the three miners and 
h . . 11 d . d 15 t ree owners or1gtna. y es1re • But miners believed that much of 
the legislation was adequate at least. 
Another statute established the office of chief mine inspector, 
an office whose first occupant was the miner, Pete Hanraty. The law 
provided also for three districts, each supervised by an assistant mine 
inspector, and set minimum requirements for ventilation and safety. 
Senate Bill Number 74 of the same year established the State Mining 
Board, created the district examining board, prohibited screening be-
fore weighing, prohibited convict labor in the state's mines, author-
ized a wei.ghman at each mine, and allowed the workers to hire their own 
checkweighman to verify the weighman's tally. There was also legisla-
tio11 requiring owners to have the permission of the governor before 
l1iring armed guards during labor disputes. However, this law was cir-
cumvented by governors who were liberal in giving permission and by 
sheriffs who deputized with abandon. 16 Nevertheless, the first Okla-
homa legislature provided generously for the mineworkers of the state. 
Probably this attitude was a mixture of respect for the miners' power 
as shown by their dominant role in the constitutional convention al-
though having but one representative, as well as the populist-
progressive spi ri.t of the state during the years before World War I. 
The tendency to favor labor continued in the ensuing years. In 
1908, the senate defeated an amendment to delete the constitutional 
prohibition of convict labor in the mines. The same year, Governor 
18 
Charles N. Haskell signed legislation which tightened mining regulations 
and established four mining districts to replace the three created the 
previous year. In 1909, another major law required payment to miners 
to be in legal tender, and another statute of the same year authorized 
miners and manufacturing workers to receive their wages twice monthly 
if they so requested. This law was largely futile because many workers 
17 feared they would be fired if they asked for the payment. The laws 
were on the books; but they needed enforcement. 
Moved from the union to the mine inspectorate, in December of 1909 
Pete Hanraty decried lax observance of the rules. 
The cause of the many [atal and serious accidents in the 
mines of this state is through the carelessness, incom-
petency and the inexcusable ignorance of the mining law, 
by some superintendents, pit bosses, fire bosses and 
miners, who, for the sake of personal gain deliberately 
violate all laws and destroy not only their own lives, 
but the lives of their fellow workers.18 
Hanraty was correct. The year 1907 was the worst for fatal and non-
fatal mining accidents in the United States to that date. Nationally, 
accidents killed 3,125 men and injured 5,316 more. From November 1908 
through June 1909, there were twenty-three fatal and seventy-two non-
fatal accidents among the 8,419 men employed at Oklahoma's mines. From 
the latter date through June 1910, fifty-one more men died. Of the 
fifty-one, fourteen fired their own shots in violation of the law, 
eleven died in unnecessary gas explosions, and five were careless in 
19 handling powder. The problem was not due to poor laws, at least not 
in this case. 
Machine regulations were a different matter. As early as 1902, 
Hanraty reported to the miners' convention that the union was not op-
posed to the introduction of machinery into the mines. What they 
19 
wanted was their share of the money to be made from the work. By 1910, 
the machines were in Oklahoma to stay but not in great numbers •. The 
miners were not willing to accept the law of 1913 which assumed every 
mine had a cutting machine. Oklahoma's miners used the method of 
"shooting off the solid," doing a minimum of undercutting prior to 
blasting. This method resulted in large amounts of fine matter, but 
the miners received payment for the run of the mine, including the 
worthless powder. The law of 1913 required that the seam be undercut 
to the full depth to be blasted. Union miners argued that without ma-. 
chines the process of undercutting was too slow and resulted in too 
great a loss of wages. A living wage was impossible. The miners asked 
for a referendum on the proposed law. In the hard fought campaign the 
operators spent $50,000 and the miners $25,000. The miners won. 
20 Oklahomans rejected the law three to one. Thus, a decade after the 
owners recognized District Twenty-one the union maintained the ability 
to defeat the owners on important matters. 
In 1913, the miners of District Twenty-one in Oklahoma gained 
wash houses and telephones at each mine. A year later, the miners of 
. 21 Arkansas at last got a mine inspector. The older state was less 
amenable to the influence of labor. 
Legislative success continued to be the rule for the miners in 
Oklahoma. In 1916, the senate passed a bill authorizing the mining of 
coal in state institutions by state prisoners. Although the bill had 
the support of Governor Robert L. Williams, the house defeated the 
22 
measure. On the legislative front, the coal miners continued vie-
torious in the years prior to the "red scare." In other areas, they 
were equally successful, especially in strikes for economic gains. 
20 
In i\11gust or l90L•, the South Mci\lester district voted by a large 
majority to <tCCl•pt. a p<ty cut. rnther than to stri.ke. That decision 
proved the exception, as miners frequently struck. The strike in 1908 
of 10,000 miners prompted the Shawnee Daily Herald to report that a 
strike every two years was becoming a habit. On schedule the miners 
walked out in 1910. Oklahoma and Kansas mines closed on April 1, and 
on August 26 the Farmers Federation advertised a "Coal Famine Approach-
ing" due to the three-month delay in shipments of coal from Colorado. 23 
The strikes ended victoriously. In 1910, the miners received support 
from a 25 cent a week assessment on all members of the Oklahoma Federa-
tion of Labor. The workers' movement had the funds to provide assist-
ance. In 1913, the disbursements of organized labor totalled almost 
$3,000,000 according to E. E. Anderson, the president of the Fort Smith 
Central Trades and Labor Council. 24 
Organized labor enjoyed its greatest successes in the years prior 
to World War I. And it continued to do well during the war years, es-
pecially in the organizing of non-union miners. In May of 1914, or-
ganizer W. James Moran and a committee of union men went to Johnson 
County, Arkansas, to resolve differences between the miners and the 
operators. District Twenty-one President Peter R. Stewart was in Coal-
gate, Oklahoma, resolving the dispute in the Missouri, Kansas, and 
Texas Railroad's mines which idled 800 miners for five months. Then 
Stewart joined Moran and George Baker, an organizer from Kentucky,· in 
Johnson County. Organizers enrolled many men into the union but failed 
occasionally. The Fernwood Coal Mining Company of Johnson County re-
mained unorganized until May of 1917. After it was added to the list 
21 
of successes, there was not a single non-union mine in Districts Four-
. 25 
teen, Twenty-one, or Twenty-four. The union appeared to have total 
control. 
Strikes were numerous in District Twenty-one during the years in 
which the United States tried to avoid the European war. Some stop-
pages followed national orders, but others were local, as that against 
the Missouri, Kansas, and Texas. In 1914, a strike at Russellville, 
Arkansas, resulted from the miners' demand for both an entrance and an 
exit in the mine. In winning their cause the miners received aid both 
from the state mine inspector who threatened to close the mines and 
. 26 
from the courts which upheld the law. 
A strike in 1915 at McCurtain, Oklahoma, involved miners who re-
fused to work in a shaft which had been closed since an explosion in 
1912. Doubtful that the mine was safe, the miners wanted safety meas-
ures and higher pay for their risks. The operators rejected these re-
quests, preferring to run an open shop. Judge Ralph E. Campbell of the 
United States District Court at Muskogee, Oklahoma, aided the miners by 
denying an injunction to prohibit union interference with the activities 
of strikebreakers. The operators came to terms in April of 1915 after 
the new president of the district, Pete Hanraty, on taking office de-
clared that strikes in the Southwest were a thing of the past. 21 
Also, Hanraty gained a union contract with the Samples Coal and 
Mining Company near McAlester. Despite opposition from the men, who 
felt that their labor was contributing to a suit against their union 
(see Chapter III), Hanraty averted a strike at the Bache-Denman Com-
pany's Kali-Inla mines. He failed at Jimtown, Arkansas, and Henryetta, 
22 
Oklahoma, and his successors failed to control the miners who struck at 
Dewar and at Hartford number four in 1916. 28 
Hy IQl6, small strikps were unimportant to the leaders of the 
union. Once again the time came to negotiate contracts nationally. In 
December of 1915, the U.M.W.A. and operators from Pennsylvania, Ohio, 
Illinois, and Indiana met to reestablish the joint conference, defunct 
since 1914. Traditionally this area usually set precedents for con-
tracts in the Southwest. By April of 1916, the miners ratified the 
contract by a vote of 84,000 to 42,000. But District Twenty-one and 
the rest of the Southwest declined to confirm the agreement. 
Officials of District Twenty-one threatened a strike unless the 
Southwest Interstate Coal Operators Association (S.W.I.C.O.A.) agreed 
to meet with district representatives at McAlester. The operators ob-
jected because District President John Wilkinson, negotiating in Kansas 
City, sent William Dalrymple in his stead. Moreover, the union and the 
owners were on bad terms because the union had declined joint arbitra-
tion of a walkout the previous December. Wilkinson, Dalrymple, and 
U.M.W.A. President John P. White met with three representatives of the 
S.W.I.C.O.A. at Kansas City and resolved the matter. 29 
After the trouble in Oklahoma, the negotiations in Kansas City 
seemed to succeed. Reportedly the contract won agreement on July 19, 
except for the question of whether to annul or to keep earlier joint 
board decisions. That issue resolved, there was another small problem 
concerning working conditions. In September, the miners prepared to 
strike; those in Kansas did. The owners yielded to the combined pres-
sures of the Kansas strike and the formation in Oklahoma of the Okla-
homa Coal Operators Association (OK.C.O.A.) The OK.C.O.A. sought a 
separate peace. But,the negotiations shattered on the shoals of a 
minor detail. This time miners wanted to be hired in the order that 
they applied. Owners preferred to hire as they chose. Unable to win 
30 
agreement, the miners struck. 
On November 1, 1916, 7,000 miners in Oklahoma left their jobs. 
The 1,000 miners working for members of the S.W.I.C.O.A. remained at 
23 
work as did the non-union miners and engineers and pumpers who were ex-
empt from strike calls. Within two months, the OK.C.O.A. and District 
Twenty-one agreed to their first contract, basically that determined at 
Kansas City. District miners ratified the contract on January 17, 1917. 
Despite coal shortages due to the strike, by the middle of 1917, accord-
ing to one source, 3,000 of 8,000 miners had departed the mines for jobs 
. h . 31 1n ot er regions. Unsettled conditions in the coalfields and better 
opportunities elsewhere caused the decrease of membership which en-
couraged the disintegration of the district. 
But the union still had housekeeping to do, as in the convention 
of 1916 of District Twenty-one at Fort Smith. Aside from dealing with 
the terms to be requested at Kansas City, the union tried to organize 
itself. It requested that the international assume the burden of law-
suits against the district, defeated an attempt to eliminate the 35 
cents a month defense fund assessment, defeated the effort to reduce 
the punishment for embezzlement from prohibition of holding office for 
life to a banishment of five years, established a five year requirement 
for eligibility for pension and aid benefits, and defeated the attempt 
to keep the sons of mine officials from membership in the union. The 
convention resolved that each local should use only union-made powder 
in the m~nes. Its major effort was the attempt to provide hospital 
care for accident victims. The committee found no better system than 
that already in use by· twenty-seven ~nions in the Fort Smith area. 32 
Although the strike intervened and later the war, union affairs con-
tinued despite outside problems. 
The union involved itself in broader issues. In a Labor Day 
24 
speech in Oklahoma City in 1908, President Pete Hanraty drew an analogy 
between Christ, Socrates, and Columbus and Samuel Gompers, John 
Mitchell, and Frank Morrison as martyrs in the ''self-sacrificing strug-
gle for the welfare of humanity ••• the greatest moral force of the 
33 
age." llanraty presided also in 1907 when the district convention 
passed unanimously a resolution of thanks to the jury which cleared 
Bill Haywood of charges of murder. This was done despite Hanraty's 
opposition to "I.W.W.ism, riot and insurrection" which threatened to 
d h h f h k . 1 34 estroy t e ope o t e wor 1ng c ass. 
Hanraty was not the only miner to concern himself with others. 
Edgar Fenton, miner and president of the Oklahoma Federation of Labor, 
in 1913 admitted favoring the socialists although the official labor 
newspaper, the Labor Unit, opposed socialists and the Industrial Workers 
of the World. The miners' convention of 1914 supported its brothers in 
Colorado as we] I. 
The Colorado mines became a battleground with Ludlow being the 
most famous bloodletting. After that disaster United States troops 
guarded the mines and kept "scabs" from the area until President Wood-
row Wilson decided to remove the military. The miners' president, John 
P. White, was determined that the U.M.W.A. would never surrender in 
Colorado. After Hanraty, who was working as an organizer in Colorado, 
spoke to the District Twenty-one convention, the group acted. Secretary 
25 
Fred W. Holt, one time Socialist candidate for governor of Oklahoma, 
sent telegrams to the congressmen from Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Texas 
requesting their support against Wilson's plans. The miners feared the 
possibility of another Ludlow if the state militia used its $1,000,000 
legislative appropriation. 35 
The district also had antipathies toward certain politicians; 
Charles N. Haskell and William H. Murray were early targets. Labor 
regarded Haskell as less than a hero. In 1907, he was a leader of the 
Citizens' Alliance, an organization considered by Oklahoma Federation 
of Labor secretary J. Harvey Lynch as a pro-business, anti-labor coa-
lition trying to lower wages and destroy the union. In addition, 
critics charged, Haskell was involved in railroad schemes and had non-
union labor paint his headquarters sign. And he was also a tax and 
debt dodger according to vice-president Thomas Leach. 36 
As early as 1908, the miner-dominated Oklahoma Federation of Labor 
decided to oppose Murray for any office he sought. Labor accused 
Murray of duplicity in matters affecting the working man; it considered 
him a tool of business as well. Labor critics labelled Murray as dis-
f 1 f 1 d . d "d . f h d . d f . . 1 113 7 respect u o a ies an esitute o onor an vo1 o pr1nc1p e. 
Yet both Haskell and Murray served as governor despite labor's op-
position, thus proving that the unions were not all powerful. 
When war came in 1917, the miners did their part. Sam Boydston, 
secretary of the district, received a letter from Secretary of Labor 
W. B. Wilson asking that the secretary investigate enemy eliens. Wilson 
told Boydston to encourage friendly aliens and to report those in the 
38 pay of an enemy government. Boydston failed to record whether he 
captured any spies. 
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Even during the good years in District Twenty-one, problems '\le-
veloped. In 1906, Arkansas miners, dissatisfied with the district 
agreement whicl1 retained the scale of 1903, requested a separate dis-
trict. <:laiming no authority to grant the division, Hanraty wrote 
President John Mitchell who informed the miners through Hanraty that 
their proper course of action was to have defeated the terms at the 
time, when they had voted on them. Before the war, Texas also at-
tempted to acquire its own district as did Oklahoma. In the summer of 
1917, the miners of Arkansas tried again to separate, claiming that 
their mining laws differed from those of Texas or Oklahoma. All at-
f ·1 d h . 1 . 39 tempts ai e at t e nationa convention. Thus District Twenty-one 
remained intact. 
Despite its problems, District Twenty-one prospered in the years 
prior to World War I. Wages rose; mines became safer--at least ac-
cording to law--and employed more men; and the union governed the em-
ployees of all the mines of the area. The years between.the strike of 
1903 and the postwar strike of 1919 were the days of greatest glory 
for the miners of Oklahoma and Arkansas. But the miners had assist-
ance. 
In the constitutional convention the demands of labor were basic-
ally the same as those of the Democratic Party. And the Democrats had 
almost total control of the delegates. Only one independent and a 
handful of Republicans opposed the progressive provisions of the con-
stitution. Oemocratic assistance also helped the miners gain desired 
legislation. 
The first legislature of the state of Oklahoma was dominated by 
democratic-progressives whose views agreed with those of labor. As 
27 
this first legislature passed the l~ws which remained in effect until 
the mining code was revised in the 1920s, their actions protec~ed the 
miners even after the mood of the state had drifted to the right. That 
the miners were unable to control the government was at least indicated 
by their futile crusades against Murray and Haskell in the years before 
strikes began to alienate some of the people. 
Strikes provided the best indication of union strength in prewar 
Oklahoma and Arkansas. From 1903 through 1916, there were at least 
seven major strikes which closed the fields almost entirely. In each 
instance, the union won its demands. Of course at this time the na-
tional union was strong and consistently gained improved conditions 
for its men. Help from the national union as well as aid from other 
laboring men in the district increased the strength of the district in 
its biennial struggles with the owners. The presence of effective 
leadership led to a number of successful strikes. 
District Twenty-one was fortunate in its leadership in its first 
dozen years as the recognized agent for the miners of the region. Pete 
llanraty was clearly the greatest of those who shaped the labor history 
of Oklahoma. His efforts in the struggles of 1899 to 1903, his work at 
the constitutional convention, and his leadership of both the district 
and the Oklahoma Federation of Labor caused the movement to flourish. 
Even as mine inspector in 1908-1909, Hanraty's sympathies with the 
miners led him to attempt rigid enforcement of the mining code. His 
replacement as district president, Pete Stewart, benefitted from Han-
raty's strength. 
From 1908 to 1914, Stewart continued the work of strengthening the 
union. He was fortunate that there were no major crises in his 
28 
administration. He retired before the firsLproblems appeared, and he 
died before the developments which led to the collapse of District 
Twenty-one. 
Even before the war, problems arose which eventually caused the 
district virtually to disappear. Litigation, ineffective leadership, 
economic and social changes--all contributed to reduce the miners' 
union in 1927 to its lowest point since Pete Hanraty built a viable 
organization on the ruins of the Knights of Labor and of U.M.W.A. 
District Twenty-one in 1903. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE BAD YEARS 
As early as 1915, the national headquarters had reason to be dis-
satisfied with the operations of District Twenty-one. The political 
scandal of the trial of Pete Hanraty, coming as it did at the time when 
the union was fighting a suit against the Coronado Coal Company, caused 
President White to be offended by the district. The collapse of the 
union came in the 1920s, but its problems stemmed from the years prior 
to the war. Though the lawsuit came earlier, the two issues can be 
better understood if separated. The Hanraty case was symptomatic. The 
suit was terminal. 
In 1914, the district had a major scandal on its hands. Secretary 
Fred Holt was charged with accepting $9,000from a s.w.I.C.O. slush fund 
during contract negotiations in 1910 and 1912. Coming at the time of 
contract proceedings, these charges caused the negotiations to be 
broken off, but the slush fund members of the s.w.r.c.o. board resigned, 
and Holt defended himself ably. After a trial of more than two weeks, 
Holt gained exoneration by a vote of 116 to 18. 1 The case was im-
portant because it increased factional differences which came into the 
open in the trial of Hanraty in 1915. 
Hanraty was president of the district from 1900 to 1908. On 
leaving office, he served as the state's first mine inspector, then as 
mayor of McAlester. before being removed from that office. 2 After 
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serving as an organizer in the coal fields of Colorado and Wyoming from 
1912 to 1914, Hanraty once again sought and attained the presidency of 
the district in April of 1915. By August, Hanraty was in deep trouble. 
In late July, the executive board of District Twenty-one met to 
hear three charges against their president. Hanraty allegedly made a 
contract at less than union scale at McCurtain, Oklahoma. This was 
done without consulting either the local union or the executive board. 
Also, Hanraty allegedly settled a $3,750 claim at Spadra, Arkansas, for 
$375 without consulting the men involved and in violation of the 
U.M.W.A. constitution. Finally, the board accused Hanraty of settling 
claims at Hartford, Arkansas, in contravention of the constitution and 
the contract with the coal company. 3 The board, however, was unable to 
reach a determination. 
The board consisted of three men who wanted to submit the charges 
to the membership at a convention. They were opponents of Hanraty. 
There were three supporters of Hanraty who pref erred to keep the issue 
in executive session. The seventh member had his own problems, being 
engaged in fighting a petition for his recall. The board asked Presi-
dent White to intervene, but he declined to act until the board com-
pleted its action. After an eighteen-day deadlock in which the normal 
affairs of the union ceased, the board called a convention for Septem-
4 ber 21, 1915. 
Immediately on learning that he was to be tried, Hanraty issued a 
form letter to encourage his supporters. According to Hanraty, "The 
salvation of our organization is at stake. 115 He continued his attack 
at the convention. He alleged that the convention was packed against 
him with a clique of at least twenty non-members seated in order to 
applaud his . clctn1ctors and harass his supporters. Also, he attacked 
{ 
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the district's attorney for abuse of funds, forcing that individual to 
·I 
use twenty-eight pages of the report of proceedings to answer the 
charges. In addition, Hanraty cited the accomplishments of his first 
administration--establishing the organization~ gaining the eight-hour 
day, eliminating the company store, and others. As well as alleging a 
"well organized scheme to make my administration a failure," Hanraty 
stated, "I have suffered more for [District Twenty-one] perhaps than 
6 
any man in this Southwestern country." 
The climate of the proceedings was tense, with the· delegates being 
searched for firearms. Although searchers found none, they confiscat.ed 
approximately 100 knives from 150 delegates. In this environment, the 
board expected the delegates to settle factional disputes which dated 
back several years and which White had already warned could be but 
detrimental to the district's future. 7 The decision boded ill for such 
hopes. 
The convention was unable to reach a decision on the Hartford is-
sue. Delegates voted to censure llanraty for the McCurtain matter, and 
they judged their president guilty of the charges concerning Spadra. 
The vote was eighty-five to sixty-nine. The penalty was removal, al-
though, as an expert on the bylaws of the union, Hanraty felt that a 
resolution of removal was in order. The convention ignored Han.raty, 
establishing a committee to determine how to deal with the business of 
·the district. when the presidency was empty or in doubt. The convention 
decided to have the vice-president, the secretary, and four board mem-
hers resign and to place the union in the hands of White until an 
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election was held. On October 7, the.convention adjourned. 8 But the 
problems remained. 
The district sued Hanraty for $1,393.16 which he allegedly had 
drawn for two nonexistent organizers. Because of the suit, Hanraty 
lost his place on the ballot in the upcoming election. The suit was 
used to deny Hanraty a seat at the 1916 convention as well. On January 
1, 1916, the members of Local Union 2830 wrote President White asking 
a hearing for llanraty, claiming that the denial of Hanraty's place on 
the ballot was irregular and asserting that Hanraty would have been re-
elected overwhelmingly. 9 The split remained, and the union drifted. 
The election which caused the controversy was futile. It decided 
minor offices, but no candidate received a majority in the important 
races. In February, J. G. Murry reportedly won the presidency, but a 
report from McAlester in March indicated that because none of the 
thirty-two candidates received a majority, a new election was 
scheduled in e;1rly April. Whether elected in February or April, by the 
time of the convention, Murry was president of District Twenty-one, the 
I . d 'd . I. h JO t nr pres1 ent wit nn t e year. Before the year ended, there was a 
fourth. This instability of leadership plagued the union until David 
Fowler became president of the provisional district in 1930. 
Innnediately after the war, prosperity and good times appeared to 
return for the miners as well as the rest of the nation. But super-
ficial successes failed to conceal deeply rooted problems which 
eventually led to the collapse of District Twenty-one in the postwar 
decade. The successful strike of 1919 was the last victory which the 
union enjoyed for almost twenty years. 
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In 1918, the U.M.W.A. signed an agreement to maintain production 
by yielding their right to strike for the duration of the war or for 
two years, whichever came first. When the war ended in 1919, the 
miners wanted a share of the benefits of the wartime prosperity--high 
prices and higher profits--which their patriotism had allo~ed the 
owners. Acting President John L. Lewis determined to prove~himself by 
calling a strike for November 1, 1919. 
The miners' demands were stiff. They asked for a 60 percent in-
crease in wages. Also they wanted a thirty-hour week with time and 
one-half pay for overtime and double time for Sundays and holidays. 
Lewis's men also required an end to the penalty clause which allowed 
an operator automatically to collect a $1.00 a day fine from each miner 
involved in an illegal strike. Finally, the miners declared that the 
contract of 1918 ended effective November 1, 1919. The owners had the 
h . . . ff "k 1l N c 01ce--s1gn a new contract or su er a str1 e. o new agreements 
were signed. Rather, the owners' reactions were vigorously negative. 
Unions suffered in 1919 when the "Red Scare" began. Americans 
feared that anarchists, socialists, or unionists might overwhelm the 
sense of democracy that they had just fought a war to preserve. Amer-
icans preferred that government officials use whatever means were 
necessary to prevent unamerican activities such as strikes. Conse-
quently, the government sought an injunction to prevent John L. Lewis 
from striking. 
In Indianapolis on October 31, 1919, Judge A. B. Anderson ruled 
favorably on Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer's contention that the 
United States continued in a state of war. Thus the legislation which 
prohibited strikes for the duration of the war was still valid. The 
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U.M.W.A. had no right to endanger the military effort by stopping the 
12 production of coal. Lewis chose to defy the courts and the adrriini-
stration. The miners of District Twenty-one supported his stand. 
On October 30, 1919, the Fuel Administration reinstated wartime 
price ceilings. The first division of troops departed for the coal-
fields of Huntington, West Virginia, and the federal government seized 
all coal in transit. U .M.W.A. headquarters issued a statement calling 
13 President Woodrow Wilson a "usurper." Even before the strike, the 
opposition of government and the antipathy of many citizens became 
evident. 
Oklahoma Adjutant General Charles F. Barrett ordered all national 
guard units in the state to prepare for an immediate call to active 
duty.· Barrett conferred with Governor James Brooks Ayres Robertson 
about the situation, and the governor asked Attorney General Palmer to 
deport all aliens who struck. Dorset Carter, president of the Oklahoma 
Coal Operators' Association, told the governor that the members of the 
association were willing to try to keep the mines open with the aid of 
: d ·1· . 14 promise m1 1t1a. 
F. w. Lukins of the S.W.I.C.O.A. suggested a compromise on October 
30. He asked that the miners remain at work while negotiators de-
termined a wage scale. Also, he informed the governors of Missouri, 
Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Kansas that the operators were willing to ar-
bitrate if state laws allowed. But most people wanted more vigorous 
action. District Twenty-one Vice-President Jack Britton scored 
Governor Robertson's threat to keep the mines open. District President 
John Wilkinson cited figures on inflation to justify the increases 
asked. Since the preceding contract the price of bacon had increased 
by 114 percent and that of ham had doubled. Other price increases 
were similar. 15 Thus a 60 percent increase was not unreasonable. 
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The governor and people of the state chose not to talk of prices. 
The strike was called a "lawless conspiracy" which must not be allowed 
to disturb millions of people. The commercial club of Wetumka, Okla~ 
homa, endorsed the governor as did the Chamber of Commerce of Miami, 
Oklahoma. Rather than yield to union power, they said, "let the show 
down come." 16 
Despite the injunction, the mines emptied on November l~ Na-
tionally almost 400,000 miners quit work while from 12,500 to 15,500 
men struck in District Twenty-one. Only one mine in all the district 
remained in operation--that at Pittsburg, Oklahoma, which had a daily 
17 
maximum capacity of 500 tons. Meanwhile, the rhetoric continued. 
The injunction caused the railroad unions to offer their good of-
fices in the settlement of the strike. Samuel Gompers and the American 
Federation of Labor protested to Palmer, threatening a general strike 
to support the miners. District Twenty-one Secretary Eugene Ross told 
his men to ignore the injunction, and he criticized the governor for 
calling for troops. Ross ordered peaceful striking and the maintenance 
of the idled mines by engineers, firemen, and general maintenance men. 
President Carter of the OK.C.O.A. issued the standard statement that 
the mines would remain open; the miners of the district countered with 
the normal rebuttal. They were confident that not enough strike-
breakers could be found to keep the mines in operation. The state 
mine inspector, Ed Boyle, stated that he would not allow the mines to 
be run by unskilled labor, troops for example. But Boyle denied tak-
. 'd 18 i.ng si es. 
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Despite all the rhetoric the facts were that the miners were out, 
the people weic angry, and troops were on their way to the coal areas. 
Adjutant General Barrett wasted no time in ordering the national guard 
to the fields although no trouble had occurred and although the only 
potential trouble spot was McAlester. The people wanted troops to pre-
vent rioting. 19 The situation was typified by events in Henryetta. 
I Reportedly, in Henryetta approximately 60 percent of the miners 
were "foreigners," 40 percent of them were not naturalized, and "most" 
were unable to speak English. Most of the "troublemakers" were 
English-speaking individuals who indoctrinated their companions in the 
tenets of bolshevism. Of course American miners were not radicals. The 
situation was summed up in the following from the Daily Oklahoman: 
While much talking was being done here tonight by the 
radical striking miners, the presence of Company I, 
3rd Infantry, Oklahoma National Guard, had a quieting 
influence on any who might be inclined to advocate 
violence.20 
With the "Red Scare" flourishing, the people of Oklahoma refused to al-
low alien radicals to destroy their state. 
On November 3, with troops in the field, the adjutant general 
stated that he would declare martial law if necessary. Coal supplies 
were critical already; the supplies of Lawton, Oklahoma, were gone. 
Under pressure and afraid of being associated with Communists, Presi-
dent Wilkinson of District Twenty-one declared that the strike was 
merely a business proposition. His organization tolerated no "reds" 
d h . . 21 an was watc ing agitators. 
Radical groups appeared at Hartshorne and Gowen, Oklahoma. Spe-
cifically mentioned were the Industrial Workers of the World. State 
investigators had these individuals under surveillance. Reportedly, 
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there were 168 known radicals in the area, but the state had no evidence 
22 to prosecute. However, state agents continued to investigate. 
Of more immediate concern than radicals was the dire shortage of 
coal. On November 4, Governor Robertson reportedly prepared to call 
for 8,000 men to mine the state's coal. Prepared to offer $5.00 in 
wages each day, the governor believed that even unskilled labor could 
mine a sufficient quantity. But the coal could not be transported be-
·cause of the ban on movement. The governor informed the citizens that 
federal authority permitted them to take coal from the railroads if 
needed. The warden at McAlester planned to open the state mines with 
convict and non-union labor. On November 10, Robertson ordered Ad-
jutant General Barrett to open the penitentiary and strip mines of the 
McAlester region. 
They had reason. 
23 The miners felt that everyone was against them. 
The Daily Oklahoman of November 11, 1919, reported that district 
mine inspector William T. Williams spent two days in the McAlester 
penitentiary on suspicion of interfering with the operators of the 
prison mines. It was alleged that Williams prepared to post notices 
that convict labor was against state law. Williams received authori-
zatlon to do so from State Mine Inspector Boyle. Williams gained re-
lease when the adjutant general found that the inspector had done no 
24 
wrong. 
Although Woodrow Wilson reportedly mediated a settlement on No-
vember 13, the mines remained closed. The banner headline of the 
Daily Oklahoman proclaimed "Coal Miners in Insurrection, Governor 
. 25 
Says." Robertson threatened to seize the mines if the miners did not 
26 
return. But the strike continued, and the situation continued to de-
teriorate. 
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By early December, trains which had been allowed previously to 
move once again halted operations. Stores in the Southwest received 
notification to.be open only from 9 A.M. to 5 P.M. and to be heated to 
no more than 68 degrees. The nation returned to wartime restrictions. 
Oklahoma City volunteers started for the mines of McAlester protected 
by two companies of the Twenty-fourth (black) Infantry and one company 
of cavalry, all from Columbus, New Mexico. In Arkansas, Governor 
Charles H. Brough asked for volunteers to mine coal and to load the 
. 27 
coal which was already above ground. 
Efforts in Oklahoma showed the effectiveness of volunteers. While 
other governors, as in Missouri, were seizing mines, Governor Robertson 
of Oklahoma went to McAlester, donned hip boots, and began mining coal. 
He had 300 volunteers, the number of which quickly grew to 500 to help 
him, among them thirty Oklahoma A and M students who mined four car-
loads of the twenty-one reportedly dug. There were a dozen women using 
picks and shovels at Poteau. At this time, the governor declared 
martial law in the coal counties--Pittsburg, Latimer, Leflore, Haskell, 
Coal, and Okmulgee--and national guardsmen joined federal troops in 
. h 1 28 protecting t e vo unteers. 
According to the adjutant general, under martial law private meet-
ings in the area needed his authorization. He ordered the seizure of 
all agitators and all coal not already in government hands. Agents 
arrested two radicals at Alderson for trying to keep union men from re-
turning to work. Before matters became worse, a compromise between 
Wilson and Lewis ended the strike. The agreement called for a 14 per-
cent increase in wages and an investigation to determine if further 
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raises were justified. On December 12, 1919, the troops and volunteers 
b 1 . h ·1 . 29 egan eaving t e coa regions. 
The strike of 1919 was short, less than six weeks, and successful 
to a degree. Nationally, John L. Lewis showed his ability to confront 
the government, and he escaped with only a fine for contempt. But in 
District Twenty-one the victorious miners might have seen the sign of 
the future, and the future looked bleak. District unionists numbered 
more than at any time in their history. They used the strike as an 
economic weapon as they had done successfully in the past. But the 
miners were isolated. In previous strikes, the government remained 
neutral if not aiding the strikers. This time the governor entered 
with all his powers on the side of the owners. He had the support of 
the people for his actions. Oklahomans perceived miners as radical 
agitators who might destroy the Oklahoma way of life, although some 
were good Americans. The strike removed the sympathies which were es-
sential for a strong but not overwhelming political force. Whereas 
the miners had gained all they wanted prior to the war, after 1919 
they were reduced to asking and being granted only what was considered 
best for them and for the rest of the state. 
The lack of leadership illustrated by the Hanraty case was corn-
pounded by the major event of the history of District Twenty-one--the 
only episode occurring in the area which was important enough to ap-
pear in the history of the U.M.W.A. published as a golden anniversary 
edition. This event was the Coronado lawsuit. 
Franklin Bache of the Bache-Denman Coal Company which owned the 
Coronado Coal Company was not sympathetic to unions. In 1913, he lost 
a major contract to the president of the s.w.r.c.o.A. Bache believed 
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that the unions and the rival operator were in collusion because a 
strike at the same period cost Bache $3,000 in fines by the association. 
In March of 1914, Bache sued the president for bribing officials of the 
district. This incident was but one of the fifty-nine differences be-
tween Bache-Denman and District Twenty-one in the years from 1912 to 
1914. 30 Bache was tired of unions. 
On April 4, 1914, Franklin Bache declared his mines to be open 
shop. His men received the choice of leaving the union or leaving the 
mines. On April 6, there was a riot at Prairie Creek mine number four. 
Apparently, a local constable went to the mine to arrest guards for 
profanity but left without taking action. On his departure, a crowd of 
union supporters estimated at 2,000 gathered at the mine where drinking 
and rhetoric were vigorous. The crowd rioted, beating four guards and 
nailing flags to the tipple, one American and the other reading, "This 
is Union Man's Country. 1131 
Franklin Bache declined to attend a hearing before Arkansas Labor 
Commissioner J. J. Clary. District Twenty-one President Pete Stewart 
attended and testified that the open shop violated a contract due to 
expire in July of 1914. He noted also that the Bache-Denman properties 
were the best in the state. Their problem was mismanagement. On May 
1, the hearing moved from Fort Smith to Hartford, Arkansas. 32 
But a more important hearing was taking place--that to determine 
whether the union should be barred from Bache-Denman property. Shortly 
after the riot, a judge in Little Rock issued a temporary restraining 
order. In May, a Bache-Denman subsidiary, the Mammoth Vein Coal Com-
pany, sought to make the injunction permanent. Claiming they feared 
violence, seventeen mine guards fled to Sort Smith to avoid testifying. 
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Those persons who testified had differing views of the riot. According 
to some, the miners were lawabiding family men of good reputation who 
went unarmed to the mine merely because they were opposed to the open 
shop. There, they listened to speeches which were definitely not in-
flammatory, and they dispersed when asked. Their leaders met with the 
mine superintendent and, for some unexplained reason, the riot started. 
No damage occurred. Other witnesses clearly identified eight men as 
rioters, and one miner was identified as the person who beat up a 
witness. On May 10, 1914, Judge Frank A. Youmans made the injunction 
33 permanent. 
In the meantime, attempts at arbitration failed due to Bache's 
recalcitrance. He did not trust the miners or the operators. Com-
missioner Clary continued the futile proceedings at Hartford, but he 
had no power to fine recalcitrant witnesses for contempt if they chose 
not to attend hearings. He had no authority to require attendance. 34 
The troubles continued at Prairie Creek throughout 1914. Bache 
used armed guards to protect the fifty men who worked in the mine. 
Once, the mine closed completely. Open shop men and unionists fought 
several times, and federal groops guarded the mine from May of 1914 to 
February of 1915. Finally, .Bache sued the U.M.W.A. 35 
On May 23, 1915, Judge Youmans ruled in United States District 
Court that the service of a summons on the family of a union official 
was ·invalid. To be legitimate, the summons must be served on the of-
ficial himself. This decision meant that union officials, who had 
considered themselves exempt from the liabilities of their organiza-
tion, were valid subjects of the suit. Bache served U.M.W.A. president 
White and approximately 100 other union men. Twenty-three miners' 
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locals demurred, questioning the jurisdiction of the federal court in 
the matter. Bache argued that the destroyed coal had a bill of lading; 
thus it was an interstate shipment. But Youmans decided in favor of 
the defendants' contention that the court had no jurisdiction in the 
intrastate matter of coal mining and also that the Sherman Antitrust 
Act was not applicable. Bache had to alter his suit or drop the case. 
He changed his petition, and the arguments continued. 36 
In October of 1917, the Bache-Denman Company sued again in the 
case of Coronado Co~l Co~pany et al vs United Mine Workers of America 
et al. The plaintiff charged that there was a conspiracy between the 
U.M.W.A. and all union operators which dated back to 1898. The union's 
counsei read the proceedings of its conventions into the court record 
to show that no conspiracy existed. On November 22, 1917, a jury of 
eleven farmers and one housepainter found for the plaintiff. The 
award to Franklin Bache's company was $600,000. Bache asked interest 
of $120,600 for the three years, four months, and six days that his 
money had been kept by the U.M.W.A. Bache's attorneys asked of the 
U.M.W.A. $200,000 in legal fees. The union appealed, supported by the 
American Federation of Labor. In February of 1918, Bache-Denman won 
$120,600 interest and $25,000 in attorneys' fees at Sioux Falls, 
37 Iowa. However, the case did not end there. 
While fighting a lawsuit brought by the Pennsylvania Mining Com-
pany which was a miniature Coronado case, the U.M.W.A. fought all the 
way to the Supreme Court before the courts decided the Bache case 
against the owner in 1922. Even then the suit continued. In 1923, 
Bache brought a conspiracy suit against District Twenty-one, the .na-
tional organizatiqn, and assorted members. Bache lost on a directed 
verdict for the defendants by Judge John C. Pollock in Kansas City. 
\ 
As this suit was for $2.2 million, Bache appealed, but the circuit 
court of appeals upheld Pollock. So Bache went before the Supreme 
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Court where the decision was mixed. Chief Justice William Howard Taft 
ruled that the decision in favor of the U.M.W.A. was valid. However, 
the justice also suggested new trials for the district and individuals 
in certain locals. There seemed to be clear evidence that District 
Twenty-one and the locals had planned two attacks on Kali-Inla proper-
ties. The question was whether those raids constituted conspiracy to 
. f . h . 38 inter ere wit interstate commerce. 
Finally, in October of 1927, the case ended. After requesting and 
receiving a court date for late November of that year, the Coronado Coal 
Company settled out of court. After thirteen years and four trials, 
the U.M.W.A. agreed to pay Coronado $27,500, the estimated cost of the 
fifth trial. Both the coal company and the union agreed to pay their 
own expenses, variously estimated at between $100,000 and $200,000 
39 
each. Thirteen years of increasing indebtedness for Bache and 
Coronado and thirteen years of Democlean existence for the union--this 
was the case of the Coronado Coal Company against the United Mine 
Workers of America. 
During the thirteen years of the suit, District Twenty-one changed 
from a major force in Oklahoma into a minor force almost unable to 
manage its own affairs. This weakness was recognized later when the 
international placed the district under a trusteeship, but the signs 
of weakness appeared much earlier. The strike of 1919 had seemed sue-
cessful, but the gains came only at the cost of alienation of public 
support. A strong union might afford that price but not District 
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Tw<'nly-om•. Th<' fntc>rnal wc•akrwss<'S c•vldcn('.(•c.I by the political strug-
glc•s ol the mid 1910s were• of such magnitude• that they destroyed any 
hope that a union removed from the protection of public and governmental 
support might withstand the severe pressures of the 1920s. The lawsuit 
was not of sufficient magnitude to destroy the district. As with the 
other two problems, it was important in combination. Three strikes 
there were against the union. It was in no condition to survive the 
developments of the 1920s--the decrease in use of coal at a time of in-
creased production and the rise of the open shop movement. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DEATH OF A UNION 
In the decade following 1910, the union had many problems. Fred 
Holt defended himself on charges of bribery. Pete Hanraty failed to 
clear himself of more diverse charges. The union leadership suffered. 
The public tired of District Twenty-one after the strike of 1919. 
Franklin Bache further complicated the existence of the miners' or-
ganization by involving the U.M.W.A. in a decade of litigation. But 
internal disputes, strikes, and lawsuits were all matters in which the 
union exercised some control. Although limited, this control meant 
that the problems arising from conflicts might have been minimized if 
not avoided. Other factors were totally removed from effective in-
fluence by the union. Owner hostility and economic changes were of 
sufficient magnitude to ensure that the weaknesses revealed or en-
couraged by the previously discussed problems were to prove fatal to 
District Twenty-one--in fact most of the U.M.W.A. found itself in a 
similar situation by 1930. 
District Twenty-one was earlier to fall than some, but it was not 
alone. The U.M.W.A. became trustee for District Twenty-one in 1929. 
But the Coronado case which ended in 1927, though showing the dis-
trict's frailty, was not the decisive factor, nor was the futile strike 
of 1924 through 1927. When combined with economic changes and opposi-
tion by the owners, the weakness of the union resulted in the 
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unsuccessful strike, a failure which combined with near bankruptcy to 
require the national union to assume control of the district through 
the trusteeship. 
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In 1935, Frederick Lynne Ryan wrote The Rehabilitation of Oklahoma 
Coal Mining Communities, the major work dealing with the coal industry 
of Oklahoma. Ryan discussed the rise of the business and indicated 
that the years from 1903 to 1922 were prosperous. After 1922 the coal 
industry entered a period of decline which continued. Though better, 
the situation remains today closer to the bad years than to the good 
years of the first two decades. 
Prior to 1903, there were few problems in the coal fields of Okla-
homa. Beginning in 1903, there was increasing competition between the 
large and the small operators. Railroads such as the Missouri, Kansas, 
and Texas, the Rock Island Line, and other supplied their own trains 
and other markets away from the area. Other large operators such as 
the Bache-Denman, Milby-Dow, and Central Coal and Coke companies 
prospered by exploiting large veins and shipping the coal to major 
markets in industrial cities. These firms ignored the smaller outlets. 
Small operators did well. They were able to hire five men for as 
little as $12.00 a day; they were able to sell coal locally for high 
prices of $7.00 to $9.00 a ton. This level of operation was possible 
on an investment of only a few hundred dollars and was sufficient to 
produce ten to fifty tons a day. Ignored by the large companies, a 
town near to the small operation normally purchased the small operator's 
output. Even unemployed mi~ers often combined their resources to form 
a cooperative mine which might be located on the supposedly closed, 
unleased, segregated lands. Cooperatives and dog holes--small diggings 
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on leased land and worked by the leasing miner and his family--were the 
1 
smallest operations, but even they provided a living. 
There was sufficient income for all. However, the large operators 
disliked the small employers. The small operators produced coal more. 
cheaply, partially, according to many large producers, because the 
U.M.W.A. was conniving with small companies to permit below-contract 
wages. From 1903 through 1922, the issue continued to be a major topic 
at the conventions of District Twenty-one. The district lost its 
ability to deal with the problem as early as 1916. 
From 1916, the internal problems previously discussed kept or-
ganizing efforts below the level desired by the large operators. The 
difficulty and expense of sending agents to every small digging meant 
that the union spent most of its effort organizing the large companies, 
further causing the large operators to feel that they were the target 
of a conspiracy between small companies and the union. This increasing 
hostility became apparent when the union weakened. Other pressures en-
couraged the rise of the open shop. 
But the first decades of the century were good. The number of days 
worked by a miner continued to decline except during the war years. 
Faced with increasing mechanization and a move to petroleum as fuel for 
the new machines of American industry, operators controlled production 
to keep prices high. There was prosperity until 1922. 
Ryan listed the reasons for the collapse of the coal industry as 
follows: a strike from 1924 to 1927; bank failures which hurt invest-
ment and savings; union strife; the demise of the union; loose enforce-
ment of the mining code; exhaustion of cheaply acquired coal; increased 
mechanization and more economical fuel consumption by customers; and 
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alternative employment opportunities for those once destined almost by 
birth to labor in the mines. 
From 1921 to 1929, the medium operators faded from the market. 
The various factors which increased competition from other sources of 
fuel meant that the margin of profits declined. The medium-sized mine 
operators tried to get the union to reduce wages, but the union re-
fused. The owners tried to operate with an open shop, but non-union 
men were inefficient, and guards were expensive. Better able to ab-
sorb the costs, large mines took the markets. 
But by 1929 even the large operators found themselves squeezed 
out. By that time, the railroads were using fuel other than coal for 
many of their trains. The major market of the large operators thus 
disappeared. The local market belonged to the small operators whose 
costs were minimal. The large operations tried to cut wages and econo-
mize in other ways, but the effort was futile. By the time of the de-
pression, coal mining was a critically ill enterprise. At McAlester, 
the operations were wagon mines--so-called because their production 
could be hauled in wagon rather than in coal cars--or mines employing 
between ten and twenty-five men. The large companies that remained at 
. 2 Henryetta produced coal only four months in the year. 
Combined with the decrease in the amount of coal to be mined, the 
strike of 1924 through 1927 completely destroyed the critically wounded 
union. In 1922, contract negotiations stalled nationally. On April 1, 
1922, 600,000 miners struck--a number which included 100,000 non-union 
men. President John Wilkinson of District Twenty-one reported that 
15,000 men were out in his district. Pumpers and other maintenance 
men remained in the mines as did the men of the non-union Gunter City, 
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Oklahoma, strip mines. Wilkinson declined to hold out for a regional 
settlement, preferring to deal with each individual owner on the basis 
of the agreement reached in the Central Competitive Field. 
Wilkinson decided to deal on an individual basis for a number of 
reasons. According to him the district had already a large number of 
miners who had been idle for months. His district was also unable to 
compete with gas and oil which were the important fuels in the South-
west. Further, the warm weather of summertime reduced the demand for 
coal, decreasing the impact of the stoppage. Even before the strike, 
the mines of District Twenty-one were closing earlier in the year than 
in other regions of the coal-glutted United States. Even the railroads 
--the main buyer of Southwestern coal--had supplies to last at least 
3 through July. Thus the miners of District Twenty-one struck at a time 
of weakness. 
The strike was short. By late August it ended. The miners agreed 
to return to work on the basis of the Cleveland Agreement. This 
settlement was in effect a defeat for the union. The miners gained 
only the maintenance of the old rate of $7.50 a day. In return they 
yielded their right to seek compensation through arbitration for the 
company men who operated some mine equipment during the strike. Their 
one "victory" was the agreement for a joint conference between owners 
4 
and miners to determine the wage increase for the next April 1. 
It has been noted that "arbitrations are only temporary expedients 
to enable industry to emerge from a chronic state of war ••• 115 One 
of the owners considered a friend of District Twenty-one, Thomas W. 
Wheatley, signed an agreement in 1923 which included no wage increase, 
though it did f}llqw payment for dead time such as moving machines, 
' ' 
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breakdowns, and other occasions when coal was not produced. 6 The same 
system prevailed the next year when John L. Lewis gained what was con-
sidered a great victory for the U.M.W.A. 
For a number of years the national organization was unable to or-
ganize certain areas of the mining industry. The captive mines owned 
by the steel interests were one area of union failure. Equally im-
portant were the southern mines in such states as Kentucky and West 
Virginia, areas which traditionally provided strikebreakers and non-
union coal during major strikes by the U.M.W.A. In 1924, the union won 
from southern owners the right to negotiate national contracts which 
covered the southern fields as well as the rest of the country. This 
settlement, the Jacksonville Agreement of February 18, 1924, determined 
that wages were to be maintained at $7.50 each day, and it gave the 
union the right to organize the non-union fields. But it merely al-
lowed; it did not require. The operators retained the right to resist. 
According to one source,the agreement collapsed due to operator opposi-
tion and the inability of the union to organize open-shop mines. 7 That 
was the situation in the Southwest, an area of strong operator opposi-
tion and weak union organizing efforts. 
At the time of the Southwest Agreement of 1924, fewer than one in 
four miners and mines in Oklahoma were parties to the contract. The 
rest were non-union. In Arkansas, the situation was not as bad, but 
one in three was non-union. In 1925, all mines in Texas were non-
union. That situation led the miners in Oklahoma to fight the open-
8 
shop movement. 
The idea that owners had the right to hire whom they chose was not 
new~ In the late nineteenth century, American employers had been 
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successful in enforcing the open shop, a system whereby each employee 
negotiated on a theoretically equal basis with his employer. Combina-
tions of working men to bargain more effectively were discredited. The 
closed or union shop came under attack as did national unians. By the 
turn of the century, unions gained protection of the laws, and the 
closed shop became the normal situation, as in District Twenty-one. 
But the employers regained their strength in 1919. 
Initially, the "Red Scare" was directed against communists, syn-
dicalists, and other "threats" to American life. Quickly, the orthodox 
American labor movement came to be linked in the statements of some 
owners with the radical movements. Organized labor was discredited, 
and the owners and the American public began to advocate the "American 
Plan" and other open shop movements. Economic depression after the war 
further enhanced the owners' position by weakening the union. 
As their economic situation declined in the 1920s, working men 
struck to keep earlier gains. Strikes further injured the weakened 
economy, alienating those citizens who were already afraid of radicals 
and who were suffering economically. Public support waned. At the 
same time the courts reversed earlier pro-labor interpretations of laws 
dealing with workmen's rights. 
The conservative Supreme Court of the 1920s ruled in the·Tri-
Cities Trades Case of 1921 that all picketing was illegal. In the 
Coronado Case, it ruled that a union was liable for damages occurring 
in any strike affecting interstate commerce. The courts severely re-
stricted organized labor. Between 1920 and 1924, organized labor de-
creased from 5.1 million to 3.6 million men. Those who left the 
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unions normally joined the open-shop. Those who remained in the 
unions fought for survival. 
In the spring of 1924, a Kali-Inla Coal Company mine at Cambria, 
Oklahoma, was one of four to reopen as an open-shop mine at the 1917 
scale, $5.00 a day. Though a minority, union miners refused to allow 
the situation to pass unnoticed. It was reported on July 19, 1924, 
that 100 union men marched on the Kali-Inla property and removed the 
men working there--non-union miners recruited from the ranks of former 
unionists who rejected the union. The next day, the unionists 
threatened to do the same at the Degman and McConnell mine but failed 
to appear. Th h "ff d . . lO e county s er1 was prepare JUSt 1n case. The men 
were able to close the Cambria mine. 
The mine reopened at the end of August, again with non-union em-
ployees. On the night of August 30, someone shot at the guards at the 
mine. The governor ordered the national guard--eight men and one of-
f 'd . 11 icer--to prov1 e protection. The troubles ended. 
But the union miners' plight continued. A typical contract of 
1925 provided wages at the 1917 scale. But the payment for machine-
mined coal fell from 91 cents to 71 cents a ton. Fire bosses and shot 
firers received $5.55 a day; most skilled workers gained $5.00 a day; 
and the least skilled employees earned as little as $2.00 for eight 
12 hours or more. Not surprisingly, the unionists struck in the summer 
of 1925. 
The strike was unspectacular but was the occasion for a new de-
parture in picketing techniques. In early August at Greenwood, 
Arkansas, District Twenty-one vice-president Gomer Jones addressed 350 
women at the entrance to an open-shop mine. After Jones's pep talk, 
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the women began to pray for the non-union men. Their request was that 
C:od show the open-shop men the! truth and that He bri.ng the strayed 
sheep hack into the fold of District Twenty-one. A week later at 
Henryetta, Oklahoma, wives were joined by their husbands in praying for 
the safety of the non-unionists and the awakening of "scabs" to the 
. f . . 13 virtues o unionism. But the open-shop miners reacted strongly in 
this case. 
At Henryetta, sixty-two national guardsmen and county deputies 
protected the miners from praying unionists. The workers considered 
this protection insufficient. Perceiving the prayers as veiled threats, 
the non-unionists sought an injunction prohibiting any mass meetings or 
prayers in the mine area. The injunction granted, the 2,500 unemployed 
unionists of the Henryetta coal region took their case to court. They 
sued the chief enforcer of the order, the sheriff of Okmulgee County. 
Backed by the American Civil Liberties Union, four miners prayed in 
front of the mine entrance. They were arrested by national guardsmen 
under the command of the sheriff. The American Civil Liberties Union 
protested, but the secretary of the Henryetta Coal Association re-
sponded that the action had the approval of the people of Oklahoma. 
The Union's spokesman countered with a statement that even if popular 
the action was nevertheless illegal. In mid-August, the unionists of 
Henryetta asked that their comrades be released through a writ of 
habeas corpus. Though the district court of appeals denied the writ 
because of lack of jurisdiction and though the governor offered the 
facilities of the state attorney general's office to the prosecutor, 
on August 18, Judge Thomas Doyle ruled that the right to pray was le-
gitimate. He ordered the men freed. 14 
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At the end of August, the president of District Twenty-one, 
William Dalrymple, called an official strike for the pay scale of 1924. 
This strike affected only the approximately 3,000 union men in Henry-
etta. Almost immediately there was a demand for troops in the area. 
But Governor M. E. Trapp declared that the situation was not yet criti-
cal. The Rock Island coal company tried to intimidate the residents by 
threatening to close its mines due to the difficulty of getting labor. 
In mid-September, seven miners at Henryetta suffered arrest on charges 
f . . 15 o rioting. 
Hauled before a justice of the peace, the seven won freedom. But 
officials rearrested them after the justice of the peace disqualified 
himself. Major General Baird H. Markham went to Henryetta to investi-
gate the situation. The area remained quiet, and the union declared 
itself confident of victory. 16 But in October an old nemesis again 
plagued the district. 
On September 28, 1925, shooting occurred near a Kali-Inla mine. 
According to one night watchman, for approximately thirty minutes, 
shots and dynamite blasts--600 of the former and maybe a dozen of the 
latter--raked the mine. All shots came from the weapons of others than 
the watchmen. The owner, Franklin Bache, sought an injunction to keep 
. 1 . . f h" . 17 vio ent unionists rom is property. 
In this suit, one of Bache's employees, Elton Eubanks, gave a non-
union assessment of the union men. According to Eubanks, union members 
were willing to die for their cause and often referred to "damned 
scabs," causing Eubanks to feel afraid. 18 At this time, Bache ex-
pressed his reasons for going to an open-shop business. 
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According to Bache, rejection of~the union had little to ~o with 
principle. He changed because he wanted to be free of the restrictions 
on working conditions imposed by the U.M.W.A. Also, he desired to re-
duce wages $5.00 a 19 It a practical matter to day •. was of running his 
business as he chose. 
The combination of forces arrayed against the union miners re-
sulted in a situation in 1926 in which a confidential operative of the 
owners with access to the files of the U.M.W.A. was able to report that 
the miners' union was undecided as to what to do. Union officials were 
unsure whether they should try to regain the ground lost in the South-
west. Their inclination was to concentrate on efforts to organize West 
V • . . • 20 irginia. That the traditionally hostile owners of West Virginia 
seemed more amenable to unionizing efforts than the formerly pro-
union mine owners of the Southwest was an indication of the critical 
condition which the district endured. 
Conditions continued to worsen. In May of 1926, the executive 
board of District Twenty-one removed Dalrymple from the presidency. 
The board suspended Secretary-Treasurer George Patterson as well. The 
new president was Gomer Jones, and Lawrence Sante replaced Patterson. 
Dalrymple chose not to abide by the decision. He took the keys to his 
office and disappeared. Jones established the headquarters of the dis-
trict in his hotel room in Muskogee; the Da~rymple faction seated itself 
in Patterson's hotel room in the same town. Jones then characterized 
Dalrymple as a fugitive from justice. On May 20, 1926, a committee 
from the international went to Muskogee to investigate the problem. 
Apparently Dalrymple acquiesced in the decision of the investigators 
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21 that Jones was president. That matter settled, the unionists returned 
to the intermittent strike of 1924 through 1927. 
The main events of 1927 were attempted arson and defeat. In July, 
someone attempted to burn a tipple at Clarksville, Arkansas. It was 
the second attempt in the slightly more than a month since the mine 
opened as an open-shop operation. Alert individuals doused the fire 
before any harm occurred. The once strong union was unable even to 
. 22 practice a small scale attempt at arson successfully. The strike 
failed. 
The results of the strike were clear. The custom of maintenance 
or occasional increase of wages which had prevailed since 1903 was gone. 
Owners were hostile and began cutting wages. The U.M.W.A. practically 
disappeared, unable to compete with hostile owners and non-union miners 
who were happy to be earning $5.00 a day. The futile strike completed 
the destruction of union leadership which had been ineffective and dis-
organized from the period of Hanraty's expulsion and the Holt affair. 23 
After 1927, District Twenty-one was gone. Its demise became official 
in 1929 when the international assumed control of the bankrupt district. 
As late as 1919, District Twenty-one was a major force in the 
mineral economy of Oklahoma. Political power was fading prior to that 
time, and the strike eliminated the chance that the union might be a 
legislative force. Even as a merely economic entity, the district 
might have continued for decades. The coal. seams were becoming ex-
hausted, but production continued to measure millions of tons even in 
the 1950s. But the union failed to continue. 
The reasons for the collapse of District Twenty-one were diverse. 
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Internal weaknesses appeared as early as 1915, but those weaknesses 
' were not netessarily sufficient to kill th~ union. The national or-
ganization endured similar problems as on the various occasions when 
Alex Howat of Kansas tried to unseat John L. Lewis. The national or-
ganization dealt also with the issue of socialism in the repeated ef-
forts of the radical element to push for strong nationalization 
legislation. Even the formation of the rival Progressive Miners of 
America was not sufficient to disrupt the U.M.W.A. 
Public hostility was another problem common to most areas of the 
union realm. During the "Red Scare," the U.M.W.A. suffered as much as 
any of its component parts. Public opinion continued to be hostile to 
the organization during the 1920s, but the miners remained moderately 
successful despite this opposition. 
The U.M.W.A. shared also the burden of legal action taken by 
various groups. The international officers suffered through the con-
tempt proceedings against them by the United States government; Dis-
trict Twenty-one faced only instances in which the state government 
used its military force--instances in which the military served also to 
restrain the owners. Even the Coronado case was as much a problem for 
the national organization as for the district. The international bore 
the burden of defense and assumed the expense. Legal action failed to 
cause the demise of the district, though it helped the process. 
The most important factor in the collapse of the miners' organiza-
tion in the Southwest was economic change. Throughout the history of 
District Twenty-one prior to the depression, economic changes were oc-
curring whicl1 even a strong organization backed by an understanding 
public might find difficult to counter. When coal was in great demand, 
owners were willing to give their miners almost anything to keep the 
fuel coming from the ground. Profits were sufficient to allow owners 
to be generous. But the nation moved from coal, and marginal areas 
became increasingly unnecessary. Profits diminished as larger veins 
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in other parts of the country were found. Owners tried to cut costs, 
but the union refused to cooperate by cutting wage demands. The leader-
ship failed to realize that the union must help to preserve itself by 
aiding the owners in their struggle. 
The inept officials of District Twenty-one seemed to be unable to 
recognize that the days of great demand and huge deposits of easily ob-
tained coal were gone. Men such as Wilkinson and Dalrymple continued 
to encourage their men to strike--first for increased pay, then for 
maintenance of the scale, finally for a return to the higher level of 
the past. As the union continued blindly on its road to destruction, 
owners became increasingly hostile to the organization they had embraced 
in 1903. 
Dissatisfied with the union system, the op~rators sought an alter-
native. They had no need to look far. Even in the prewar years, there 
was a system of operation enjoying success in the western fields. 
Ludlow was the most spectacular clash between unionism and the other 
system. The open-shop became recognized widely as a practical alterna-
tive, especially for the owners of Oklahoma who felt competitive 
economic pressure from nqn-union coal from the west. Even in Oklahoma, 
western coal sold for a price which the union shops, hamstrung by union 
wage levels and working conditions, were unable to meet. 
Operators began to reject the union. The union reacted in the 
only way it undcrstood--the strike. Strikes further increased owner 
hostility and raised the costs of production in the Southwest. Miners, 
whose livelihood was becoming more and more difficult to obtain as 
competition from other fields reduced the number of days worked in 
Oklahoma and Arkansas mines, deserted their increasingly disorganized 
and misguided union. They received encouragement in this process from 
the owners who were increasingly able to deny employment to union 
miners. There were too many miners to produce the amount of coal which 
operators were able to sell in a situation where demand declined while 
production maintained the levels of the war years. The market was 
glutted. 
No one factor caused District Twenty-one to fall from the high 
level of the years when it was one of the most important organizations 
in Oklahoma. None of the factors which contributed to the collapse was 
sufficient to make the fall as great as it was. Even in combination, 
the problems of the district were controllable if any one might have 
been missing. The sheer weight of so many problems over such a long 
period eventuated in the collapse of District Twenty-one. It sank so 
low that its own actions were insufficient to revive it. The revival 
of District Twenty-one came about through the efforts of the national 
organization. Even more important than the international were the 
policies of the New Deal which gave the national U.M.W.A. sufficient 
strength to rebuild itself and, in the process, to rebuild District 
Twenty-one. 
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CHAPTER V 
REBIRTH AND SURVIVAL · 
Well before the world economy crumbled in 1929, the coal industry 
was in critical condition. Whether the provision of the Dawes Plan al-
lowing German reparations in Ruhr coal was a major factor or not, in 
the 1920s the world's miners produced more coal than was needed. The 
depression in coal encouraged owner animosity toward unions which owners 
perceived as forcing operators into a non-competitive position. The 
U.M.W.A. failed in its fight to enforce the Jacksonville Agreement; 
within a few years it had dwindled to a membership of approximately 
200,000. District Twenty-one was weak already due to the numerous 
problems of the postwar period. Without the support of the national or-
ganization, the district was unable to maintain itself. With the aid 
of even a weak international, the union in Oklahoma and Arkansas sur-
vived the gloomiest period of its history. Paradoxically, the depres-
sion which was so painful for so many was tpe occasion of the revival 
of the U.M.W.A. and, therefore, of District Twenty-one, the provisional 
district. 
The district never conceded defeat. Even in the dark days, it 
made gains. In 1927, Senator Guy L. Andrews of McAlester sponsored a 
resolution to codify all the coal mining laws of Oklahoma. He also 
suggested a board to be composed of the chief mine inspector, two 
operators, and two practical miners. Nothing came of the measure, but 
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in 1929 revision of the mining code came once again to the legisla-
1 ture. 
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Tn 1927, the Eleventh Legislature established a committee to re-
vise the mining code. Two members of the group drafted the Foster-Hay 
bill, but the other three members felt the proposed legislation was 
unsatisfactory. Pete Hanraty, by this time a mine owner, and Mat 
McElroy, president of District Twenty-one, examined the proposed code 
and recommended that it be rejected. When combined with opposition 
from other sectors, this opinion resulted in the death of the bill 
without introduction in the house. William J. Holloway, governor of 
Oklahoma, called a special session of the legislature in which mining 
laws were one topic. 
The coal operators asked the union to cooperate in the creation 
of a new mining code. It was hoped that this action might revive the 
industry. Sympathetic to labor, the governor informed the Oklahoma 
Federation of Labor that he wanted cooperation from both the federa-
tion and the operators; otherwise he opposed the submission of mining 
legislation. The federation had attempted previously to get assistance 
from John Saxton who replaced McElroy when ~he autonomy of the district 
was suspended in 1929. Saxton did nothing; McElroy received the call 
to aid the labor organization. 
Second Vice President of the Oklahoma Federation of Labor Mat 
McElroy and the other miners in the organization agreed that new legis-
lation was possible. In fact they felt it necessary as there was reason 
to fear that after the election of 1931 the new governor and legisla-
ture might be less supportive of labor. The federation agreed that new 
mining laws were necessary. A former miner~ Walter Jacobs of Coalgate, 
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introduced a modified version of the Hay-Foster bill. The federation 
asked twenty-one modifications which it gained without difficulty. By 
the time the bill passed--which was accomplished without problems--
nearly thirty changes asked by the federation became part of the bill. 
The bill created a new mining code, a new electrical code, and 
more stringent safety provisions. According to the unions, the major 
aspect of the bill was that it covered strip pits and dog holes, the 
small, family-worked diggings. The fact that these operations were 
subject to safety laws meant that possibly they were more available to 
the organizing efforts of the labor movement. A report to the federa-
tion's convention of 1929 ended with the caution that if enforcement of 
this code were to be the same as in earlier years, the only protection 
for the miners would be a strong organization and a united refusal to 
work in hazardous areas. 2 
The miners no longer had the strong organization needed. The 
same convention which suggested the need for a strong organization to 
ensure the enforcement of the new mining code also provided several in-
dicators of the decline of District Twenty-one. Of more than 4,000 
members who voted for president of the federation, only seventy-eight 
were miners. Representation at the convention was better. The second 
vice-president was a miner, Mat McElroy. And of ninety-eight dele-
gates, ten were miners. President Joe C. Campbell of the Oklahoma 
Federation of Labor called for the "reorganization of this loyal group 
of trades unionists," the miners. 3 Secretary-Treasurer Victor Purdy 
noted that the Arkansas Federation of Labor was small but "permeated 
4 
with the spirit of true unionism," despite enduring difficult times. 
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Thus, the union was not in position to enforce the new safety laws, and 
no on<• <'I sc• wou 1 d. 
The flrst major disaster in Oklahoma mines occurred at Krebs, 
Indian Territory, in 1892. There, one hundred died. By December of 
1929, 300 had died. On December 17, 1929, fifty-nine miners lost their 
lives at McAlester; three survived. By early 1931, the figures were 
worse: 510 had been killed and more than 1,000 had been injured 
seriously in the nineteen major explosions which had occurred in ap-
proximately forty years. In the two years following the new mining 
legislation with more stringent safety rules, more than two hundred men 
died. Forty percent of all the fatalities occurred in that short 
period. One source, Frederick Lynne Ryan, attributed this new trend to 
the tendency of owners to be negligent, to the fact that scab labor was 
unskilled normally, and to the habit of the state department of mines 
restricting its activities to inspections and the collection of sta-
tistics rather than seeking improvements or prosecutions. 5 
The miners' union continued to decline. At the convention of 
1931 of the Oklahoma Federation of Labor, the miners' voice was vir-
tually still. In the balloting for president, only seventeen miners 
voted. The total vote count was 2,899. Even worse, not one miner at-
tended the convention, and the secretary-treasurer reported that one 
miners' local at Wilburton, Oklahoma, had disbanded. 6 But organizing 
efforts continued. 
In 1931, Provisional President David Fowler and Provisional Sec-
retary George Michaels of Provisional District Twenty-one were success-
ful in reorganizing Henryetta, Oklahoma, and some parts of Arkansas. 7 
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But their efforts were short lived. In 1931 and 1932, strikes at 
llenryetta and at McAlester proved ineffective. 
The~ strike at Henryetta ended in January of 1932, with the freeing 
of eight Ilenryetta miners of charges of dynamiting~ The prosecution was 
unable to find evidence to prove its case. One reason for this strike 
was the reductions in wages cornrnon throughout the region. In August of 
1931, the Samples Coal Company reduced wages to $3.60 a day. This rate 
was the best in the state. Henryetta and other parts of the coal re-
gion paid as little as $2.00 for eight hours. 8 So the defeat at 
Henryetta stopped nothing. In August, the miners struck again. 
As well as wanting higher wages, the miners fought for recognition 
of their union. Oklahoma Labor Commissioner W. A. Pat Murphy charged 
late in the strike that the problem was that some owners attempted to 
deny collective bargaining to their men while enjoying it themselves. 9 
The governor, William H. Murray, alleged other abuses of the law. 
Murray wrote an owner, J. C. Puterbaugh, a week after the onset of 
the strike. The governor alleged that the operator worked men as long 
as sixteen hours a day despite the clear legal provision that the maxi-
mum work day was eight hours. At the same time, Murray rebuked the 
miners for their excesses. He claimed that union miners from Arkansas 
crossed the state line and beat a non-union miner. That man was made 
to join the union, and the strikers made other threats. 10 Murray 
steered a neutral course between the opposing forces. 
While telling the owners to obey the law and the strikers to do 
the same, Murray expressed the opinion of his constituents. Murray de-
clared himself neutral in the fight. He stated also that every man 
had the right not. to join an organization of any sort. He promised to 
enforce the right of peaceful picketing, but above all he vowed that 
peace must be maintained. As to the disputants, he said, "Both must 
11 
obey the law." 
73 
Though both sides used the courts, the law was not the only tactic 
employed. On September 1, 1932, the Blackwell Morning Tribune reported 
that approximately 2,000 miners gathered at McAlester to hear Judge 
Hal Johnson's decision concerning the request of the operators for a 
permanent injunction. The owners intended that injunction to bar 
union interference with open shop operations in the strike region. 
Johnson postponed his ruling twelve days, but he allowed a continuance 
of the temporary restraining order brought by the union. Unionists 
picketed the two non-union mines which reopened on August 30 while other 
mines, including the Samples Coal Company's mine on penitentiary land, 
prepared to reopen. No disorder was reported. 12 
The next Sunday, September 4, a similar situation prevailed. The 
McAlester and Hartshorne mines remained closed. A few operators opened 
non-union mines; others attempted to negotiate. Most remained closed. 
The unionists continued to picket peacefully. The chief of the State 
Bureau of Criminal Identification, C. A. Burns, was on the scene pre-
paring a report for Governor Murray. The governor was reported as 
considering martial law if the situation remained unresolved after the 
13 
weekend. The problem continued, but Murray failed to act. 
Four days later, apparently for less than peaceful picketing, 
twenty-nine men found themselves under arrest. Their wives threatened 
to picket in their places, but that action failed to materialize. At 
the same time at Alix, Arkansas, 300 union men stopped an attempt to 
open a non-union mine. They loaded four scabs into a truck and sent 
the non-union men away. On September 12, Judge Johnson reconvened 
the hearing at McAlester. 14 
Free on bond, the twenty-nine prisoners attended the hearing. 
When they attempted to return to jail, they were refused entry. More 
important, the union's argument in its defense indicated its plight. 
The unionists argued that an injunction against District Twenty-one 
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had no validity because the district no longer existed. The judge was 
more concerned with testimony dealing with union intimidation of open-
shop employees at the Messina mine near Haileyville, Oklahoma. A week 
of testimony resulted in a permanent injunction against forty specific 
individuals and a temporary restraining order against the district. 
Five operators prepared to increase their work forces, several score 
miners endured arrest for using epithets and threats before the decision 
became known, and Provisional President David Fowler seemed confused. 
First Fowler stated that the injunction allowed the union to sta-
tion three men along each fifty foot stretch of highway near the mine. 
He believed also that two men were authorized to visit the open-shop 
mines once in an hour. The next day Fowler had no statement about any 
future action. The miners acted. They held a mass meeting after the 
decision. This meeting evolved quickly into a series of boxing matches 
d f d · · f · . 16 Th h d 1 d an a -un -raising event or pioneer miners. at appy moo aste 
only a short time. 
A report in the New York Times of September 27, 1932, noted that 
work was available for 5,000 men in Arkansas and Oklahoma because of 
improved market conditions and completed negotiations between the 
operators and the union; it proved to be wrong. On the night of Oc-
tober l, 1932, at Hartshorne four men fractured the skull of State 
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Bureau of Criminal Investigations operative John Deller. At the same 
time several bombings occurred, but fortunately there were no in-
juries; unfortunately, there were no suspects. Bureau agent O. P. Ray 
17 
was ready to ask the governor to call out the national guard. Murray 
hesitated again. 
In mid-October, the situation remained the same. Officials jailed 
twenty-three miners at McAlester, charging five with rioting and 
eighteen with intimidating non-union men while picketing. This was the 
result of disturbances at Pittsburg, Oklahoma. Murray continued to 
vacillate. He went to McAlester with Adjutant General Charles Barrett 
on October 12, 1932. There he declined to commit himself in the matter 
of using troops. He talked with the operators but refused to meet with 
Fowler. The next day Murray met with the miners. He still refused to 
commit himself because his investigation had just begun. Therefore, he 
d d . . 18 ma e no ec1s1on. The next week matters deteriorated further. 
On October 14, two women received injuries from a dynamite ex-
plosion. Someone threw a bomb onto the front porch of an open-shop 
miner, and his wife and daughter received injuries from the flying 
glass which resulted from the explosion. At that point reports began 
to circulate that some people were planning to move in with ielatives 
elsewhere. This explosion was the third in the district; the fourth 
occurred on October 31 when someone tossed dynamite into the backyard 
of a non-union miner at Hartshorne. No one was hurt though the two 
19 
children of the miner were nearby. 
By mid-November, the union cause had gained a marked degree of 
success. Labor Commissioner Murphy noted that 1,239 miners had the 
coverage of agreements between their employers and the U.M.W.A. Only 
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four companies remained open-shop. Two hundred and forty-nine open-
shop employees were left unorganized. Before the strike, miners re-
ceived a minimum of $2.00 a day and pick miners earned 85 cents a ton 
while machine miners got 64.5 cents a ton. The contract, intended to 
be effective from October 1, 1932, to March 1, 1934, called for payment 
of 59 cents a ton for machine loaders, $4.11 a day for shot firers, and 
$3.60 a day for loaders. The lowest paid laborers received $1.50 each 
20 day. In the matter of money, the strike was futile. 
The condition of the coal mining region was typified by Frederick 
Lynne Ryan in the following: 
115 old shafts and slopes, with their piles of slack 
scattered over hundreds of acres of land, with worn 
out machinery thrown helter-skelter around the mines 
in the vicinity of McAlester ••• 21 
Deterioration and decay were prevalent in the coal fields of Oklahoma. 
Recovery was not to be easy. The union made some progress in re-
building its organization during 1932, but the pivotal events in its 
recovery came in 1933. The presidential election of 1932 brought 
Franklin D. Roosevelt to the White House. Roosevelt acted to lift the 
depression facing the nation. One of the beneficiaries of his actions 
was the U.M.W.A. 
Roosevelt offered Americans a "New Deal." Among other things the 
legislation of the New Deal gave labor the right to organize. The 
first law was the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933. Designed 
to promote industrial revitalization, this act provided in Section 7(a) 
that all employees had the right to organize and to bargain collec-
tively. Revived, the U.M.W.A. added 300,000 men to its 60,000 in a 
matter of months. In 1934, the Supreme Court declared Section 7(a) 
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unconstitutional. New Dealers continued to support labor, and in 1935 
they passed the National Labor Relations Act, called the Wagner Act. 
This act reaffirmed the rights given by Section 7(a) and it was con-
stitutional. The Supreme Court confirmed the validity of the law in 
1937. 22 
By 1937, Provisional District Twenty-one was well on its way to 
recovery. In that year, the international organization signed the 
second Appalachian Agreement. Since the first agreement in 1933, the 
Appalachian area provided the standard by which contracts were meas-
ured. On February 17, 1937, the new base field agreed to an increase 
of 15 cents a ton, 13 cents to the loader and 2 cents to the cutter. 
Payment for yardage and deadwork was increased 20 percent, and the 
miners gained a six-hour day and a five-day week. They won a guaranteed 
200 days minimum employment a year and vacation time. Oklahoma Labor 
Connnissioner Pete R. Stewart asked the operators of his state how they 
23 
would be affected by those terms. Their reaction was negative. 
It was reported in May that efforts to renegotiate the contract of 
1935 had failed. Therefore, the district signed forty individual con-
tracts in an attempt to pressure the Arkansas-Oklahoma Coal Operators' 
Association to reopen negotiations. The union failed to get a district 
agreement, but it gained improved terms in the individual negotiations 
with most owners. The contracts provided for a seven-hour day, time-
and-a-half pay for overtime, and a 9 cent a ton raise for pick miners 
and a 50 cent a day increase for others. The contracts provided as 
well for a checkweighman and for the automatic checkoff of union dues, 
initiation fees, and fines. The union appeared to have recovered. 
Fowler indicated his pleasure by thanking Thomas W. Wheatley for being 
the first owner to sign a contract based on these tenns. 
But not everyone was happy. While negotiations were occurring, 
Fowler received a letter from the men of Local Union 6663. These 
miners said they preferred not to have the thirty-five hour week. 
Even with the wage increase, they stood to lose $2.00 a week in com-
parison with their previous wages. They wished also to work six days 
a week to keep coal prices low enough to meet the competitive pres-
sures from oil and gas. 24 Such sentiments, however, did not prevail. 
Relations between the owners and the union improved markedly in 
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the later 1930s. One factor was the presence of the former miner Pete 
Stewart as Commissioner of the Arkansas-Oklahoma Coal Operators' As-
sociation in 1937. That year Stewart reminded Wheatley that his action 
in working on Sunday was undesirable. The Joint Board of Miners and 
Operators prohibited such labor. Wheatley explained that there was 
only one instance. His miners had lost five days in the preceding 
month, so he ran a Sunday crew once to help the men make up lost pay. 
He indicated that operators and employees were working for the same 
25 
ends. 
The process continued. In 1938, the U.M.W.A. gained a contract 
with the Gillie Coal Company of Bokoshe, Oklahoma, ending a dispute 
which had lasted five years. David Fowler, Director of the Oklahoma-
Arkansas Congress of Industrial Organizations, announced the agreement. 
In 1939, the Samples Coal Company contracted with the provisional dis-
trict to recognize the U.M.W.A. as the exclusive bargaining agent for 
. 26 its employees. The hard liners were falling into place. 
The union reorganized the men. However, the economic changes 
which occurred in the coal industry prevented the union from regaining 
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the power that it once had. Except during World War II, coal miners in 
Arkansas and Oklahoma were part-time workers. Oklahoma miners averaged 
ninety-three days worked in both 1933 and 1934. In the other years be-
tween 1932 and 1948, the same men averaged between 102 and 145 days a 
year, excluding the war years of 1942 through 1944 when the number of 
work days exceeded the number of calendar days because of overtime and 
extra shifts. The number of miners fell from 4,100 in 1932 to a low of 
1,900 in 1940, then stabilized at between 2,000 and 2,500 through the 
1940s. Increased mechanization allowed fewer men to work less hours 
27 
to produce more coal. 
The pattern was similar in Arkansas. In the mid-1930s, 4,000 men 
produced approximately one and one-fourth million tons in a work year 
declining from 136 days in 1934-1936 to 111 days in 1939. Even during 
the war the best work year was 1943 when 3,252 men averaged 188 working 
days. After the war the number of miners and the number of days worked 
continued to decline. By 1951, 2,075 men worked 121 days a year on the 
28 
average. 
Gone were the days when 15,000 union miners walked off the job and 
caused economic hardship for the people of Oklahoma and Arkansas. The 
mines of District Twenty-one were no longer a major factor in the 
economy of the region. Coal declined as a fuel, and miners faded as a 
force. 
The coal industry in Oklahoma endured hard times even during the 
prosperous days of the 1920s. The economic disaster of the 1930s came 
as no change for those who earned their livelihood from the digging of 
bituminous. The depression merely capped the already difficult ex-
istence of miners and mine owners. But the depression offered the in-
dustry a mode of salvation. 
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During the days when the open-shop movement was vying with union-
ism, the union continued to struggle. This fight was no more than a 
holding action. The U.M.W.A. managed to survive long enough. The 
miners regrouped during the 1930s because a sufficient number of people 
rejected the economic policies of the 1920s and sought any alternative. 
The man who symbolized change in 1932 was Franklin D. Roosevelt. 
Roosevelt entered the White House committed to experimenting with 
the American economy. Some of his ideas failed, and some potential al-
ternatives escaped his attention, but the president initiated the Na-
tional Industry Recovery Act and allowed passage of the Wagner Act. 
These actions legitimized the claim of unions such as the U.M.W.A. to 
represent the workers of Arner.ica. Granted that right and supported by 
powers in Washington, D. C., the union of John L. Lewis rebuilt itself 
into an organization of greater strength than at almost any time in its 
history. Rebuilding nationally, the U.M.W.A. caused the rebirth of 
District Twenty-one. 
The causes of weakness which induced the decline of District 
Twenty-one were reduced when the international assumed control of dis-
trict affairs. No longer were internal politics and lack of money to 
hamper the district. Led by the successful reunionization under the 
approving eye of the national government, District Twenty-one became 
again the voice of Arkansas and Oklahoma coal miners. But the union 
became the spokesman for a fading industry. 
By the time of World War II, District Twenty-one was accepted by 
the operators of area mines. Cooperation rather than competition was 
the rule in the hard hit region. Conflicts occurred in the ensuing 
years, but the desperate violence of the 1930s ended. District 
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Twenty-one an<l the operators or the nrea were again working as they 
<lid in the two decades after 1903. The difference was that this time 
they were working, but no one else cared. 
By the time of World War II, the U.M.W.A. had revived. Pro-
visional District Twenty~one was just one of fifty districts that fol-
lowed John L. Lewis almost blindly. When Lewis permitted federal con-
trol of the mines, District Twenty-one acquiesced. When John L. Lewis 
ordered a wartime strike, District Twenty-one obeyed. After the war, 
the pattern continued. When John L. Lewis ordered six days mourning 
for the dea<l of the mine disaster at Centralia, Illinois, on March 30, 
1947, 400,000 miners left their jobs. Between 5,000 and 7,500 miners 
in Arkansas and Oklahoma remained absent from work from March 31 
through April 5, 1947. 29 
At the time of the walkout, District Twenty-one's mines were 
operating only one or two days a week. It was the slack season, and 
approximately 40 percent of the workers in the mines were unemployed. 
The loss in production resulting from the walkout required only one or 
30 
two days to be corrected. District Twenty-one was insignificant in 
the economy and in the union. 
After the federal government returned the mines to their owners 
in July of 1947, John L. Lewis led his union in a series of strikes 
occurring from 1947 through 1950. District Twenty-one shared the bene-
fits gained nationally. In 1948, an agreement authorized a pension of 
$100.00 each month for a miner sixty-two years of age or older who had 
twenty years of service and who had been retired since May 19, 1946. 31 
The next year the miners or District Twenty-one improved their present 
rather than their future. 
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The contract which expired in 1950 provided for wages of $13.43 a 
day for hand loaders and $13.70 a day for machine operators. Miners 
received wages for one hour of travel time and a lunch break of thirty 
minutes. The actual workday was six and one-half hours. Wages were 
high, but the full-time working season extended only from September to 
April. Won after a strike, the contract of 1950 provided a wage in-
crease to $14.75 a day. Owners contributed 30 cents a ton toward the 
pension fund, a figure which approximated $135 million a year nationally 
as the miners averaged seven tons of coal produced by each man in a day. 
Though the Taft-Hartley Act banned the requiring of a union shop, the 
owners agreed to accept one. Under Taft-Hartley, however, the calling 
of a strike became more difficult. 32 
Postwar contracts included a provision that miners were to work 
when "able and willing," but the contract of 1950 altered that to read 
that work problems were a matter of "good faith and mutual understand-
ing .1133 John L. Lewis had used the earlier provision to stop work 
almost at whim. Such was the case in the memorial stoppage of 1947. 
Lewis claimed that strikes were not his fault and that his miners had 
the right to stay home if unable or unwilling to work. That excuse 
served as his defense when miners ignored a court order which required 
that they reenter the mines. In accordance with the Taft-Hartley Act, 
the new contract had a provision which necessitated honest attempts to 
negotiate before resorting to a strike. Owners in Oklahoma wanted even 
tighter controls. 
President Ear] Wells of the Oklahoma-Arkansas Coal Operators As-
sociation described the ills of the region's coal industry in an inter-
view on February 12, 1950. According to Wells, the business was 
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breaking, <'VPn hclorP tl1<' st:rik<' ol 1950. Oklahoma and Arkansas oper,a-
Lors W(''\"(' accustomed to receiving special treatment: from the U.M.W.A. 
The district's coal seams were thinner than those of most other areas. 
Higher costs of extraction and higher freight costs were disadvantages 
to the competitive position of the mines. The U.M.W.A. allowed District 
Twenty-one to accept lower wages than the national average. But the 
new increases made Oklahoma and Arkansas coal uncompetitive. 34 Wells 
also mentioned the problems caused to the owners by the strike-prone 
John L. Lewis. 
Lewis believed in the strike, and he used it on all possible oc-
casions. District Twenty-one followed his lead each time. According 
to Wells, the seven months' disturbance of 1949 forced him to close 
two of his three mines, resulting in the loss of 144 jobs in an already 
depressed industry. Wells cited other problems: fixed expenses, such 
as pumping, continued even during a stoppage; non-union production 
equalled union production in 1949; and the situation in which non-
union mines were able to produce more coal at less cost was equivalent 
to hard competition. The result was shown in unemployment figures. 
After World War II, 8,000 miners worked at McAlester and Wilburton; 
in 1950, 500 remained. At Henryetta, the comparative numbers were 
35 3,000 and 600. 
In 1951, Oklahoma Commissioner of Labor Jim Hughes confirmed the 
decline. He noted that of 500,000 non-farm workers in Oklahoma, 45,000 
worked in mining. However, only 1,600 were coal miners while 40,000 
produced competitive fuels such as petroleum and natural gas. 36 Coal 
miners were an insignificant force. Their influence in the state leg-
islature reflected that fact. 
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rn 1929, tlw mi n<!rs found that they nct>dcd support to enact de-
sired legislation. Jn 1951, that situation was more evident. Only one 
company insured miners and that firm threatened to cease; consequently, 
the miners supported a senate bill which required tqe insurance fund to 
., 
protect minets. The bill also called for an end to the power of the 
state insurance fund director to refuse protection to workers whose oc-
cupational risks were too great. Despite the miners' support, the bill 
died in the senate. The miners were more fortunate when House Joint 
Resolution 10 failed in committee. That resolution called for a con-
stitutional amendment to prohibit the union shop in Oklahoma. Labor 
had sufficient backing to prevent an action which the miners· alone 
37 
could not. 
By 1957, Provisional District Twenty-one was even less a force. 
In that year, the U.M.W.A. was comprised of thirty districts. Only two 
of those districts were so insignificant that they needed no district 
secretary-treasurer. One was located in Birmingham, Alabama; the other 
was District Twenty-one. Also, the positions of president and:inter-
38 nati~nal executive board member belonged to one man, David Fowler. 
Under the trusteeship, now nearly thirty years old, the district had 
few duti('S. 
Fortunately for the miners of the district, the international or-
ganization continued to prosper. By 1956, the U.M.W.A. Welfare and 
Retirement Fund was a billion dollar operation. In the decade since 
1946, the fund received $1 billion and disbursed $880 million to 
nearly one million miners and dependents. Oklahomans and Arkansans 
shared in the benefits. Besides retirement, the fund gave to widows, 
orphans, and other eligible survivors, benefits including $350.00 for 
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burial and $650.00 for the year following the death of the insured. 
The U.M.W.A. established as well a number of hospitals for miners and 
dependents. The area office at St. Louis, Missouri, supervised hos-
pital and medical services for Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Okla-
39 homa, and Arkansas. Services continued to improve during the next 
decades, but District Twenty-one became less and less important. 
Coal production declined from two million tons to 800,000 tons 
between 1956 and 1967. By the latter year, the number of mine em-
ployees was 234, and 99 percent of Oklahoma's production came from 
strip mines. But the coal industry was not finished. In 1973, the oil 
embargo renewed interest in coal as an alternative to petroleum and 
natural gas. In February of 1978, the Oklahoma Miner Training Institute 
opened near Krebs. The institute was a response to federal legislation 
requiring that miners learn safety procedures before entering under-
ground workings. Though required for all miners, the institute was 
significant for coal workers because of reports that an underground 
mine was to open at Shady Point and that a mine near Stigler which had 
closed in 1972 was to reopen within the year. 40 The signs appeared 
positive for a recovery of the coal mining industry. But a return to 
the prosperity of the 1910s was not anticipated. 
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CHAPTER VI 
AS A PHOENIX 
In retrospect it can be seen that District Twenty-one enjoyed two 
decades of prosperity and power after the successful strike of 1903. 
But in the 1920s that situation changed. Natural gas and petroleum 
replaced coal as a major fuel while the union destroyed itself with 
the assistance of outside problems. By 1929, the district came under 
the control of the national organization; there it remained for one-
half a century. After 1929, the fortunes of District Twenty-one de-
pended on the actions of John L. Lewis and his successor. Until the 
mid-1950s, the international made remarkable gains for America's 
miners. But the shift away from coal continued. Eventually the na-
tional leadership began to lose the influence that only a leader of the 
stature of Lewis could enjoy. 
By the 1960s, the U.M.W.A. was in a period of decline and internal 
turmoil. It avoided the state of disarray which characterized the 
union in the late-1920s, but it was past its peak influence. The weak 
district in Oklahoma and Arkansas had no strong support to prevent it 
from declining more rapidly than the national U.M.W.A. By 1967, the 
coal industry in Oklahoma employed only 234 men. But when the national 
union faltered, the American economy provided the salvation of the 
district. 
Oil and gas became scarce. Coal remained in America's soil in 
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vast quantities. When the embargo-induced search for alternative fuels 
occurred in the mid-1970s, the depleted resources of Oklahoma and Ar-
kansas became once again profitable to extract. In a boom even marginal 
areas are subject to exploitation. 
In one respect, the history of District Twenty-one was reflective 
of the story of Oklahoma. Born at the turn of the century when pro-
gressive thought was widespread, the two shared common goals until 
World War I caused the decline of progressivism. Pete Hanraty and 
Oklahoma's politicians worked together to create for Oklahoma one of 
the most up-to-date constitutions of the time. Reform was less suc-
cessful in Arkansas because of the more difficult task needed there. 
Rather than developing something new, it was necessary to modify the 
old--an old which tradition and interest made immovable. Oklahoma was 
new territory, and the mine workers had a leader willing to exploit the 
opportunity. 
By 1919, the miners and the people of Oklahoma were working for 
divergent ends. Normalcy and reform were not compatible. District 
Twenty-one's miners began to opt for the former, leaving the union for 
the open-shop. The union faded until it was almost non-existent by 
1930. 
As Oklahomans sought a way out of the depression, they turned to 
the national gove.rnment. Government intervention became less repugnant. 
Individualism came to seem less valid than collective efforts in a col-
lective disaster. The old open-shop employers, encouraged by national 
legislation, began to recognize that their salvation was tied to that 
of the U.M.W.A. Faced with competition from alternative fuels and 
outside sources of coal, the mine owners cooperated with the union to 
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resolve differences peacefully. By 1937, the coal fields were the 
scene of cooperation, not conflict. Strikes continued in the next 
forty years, but they were not violent. National acceptance of labor's 
right to bargain collectively and to strike meant that the owners and 
the workers disagreed but without animosity. 
By the 1970s, Oklahoma was a typical state. Except for a number 
of archaic laws, it was little different from the other forty-nine 
states. District Twenty-one was in a similar condition. It continued 
to exist as one of many unions, being noticed only in cases where na-
tional actions--strikes and elections--called for local activity. The 
district was also somewhat of an anomaly, being one of the last to be 
freed from trusteeship, not regaining control of its own affairs until 
1973. 
District Twenty-one was never of national importance. Its in-
fluence on Arkansas was limited; that on Oklahoma temporary. The dis-
trict provided, however, important influences on the state, and it was 
significant as a reflector of trends in American and Oklahoman history. 
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